Energy Policy Melt-Down • Harvard Hatches a Profession

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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April 14, 1979

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

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The Return of Political Philosophy

Ronald Dworkin Reports From the Field

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TRB

from Washington
April 14, 1979

Question Time

Who said he favored "subjecting Cabinet officers to questioning before the entire Senate"?

Answer: Walter Mondale, now vice president.

Who said, "I believe that it would be helpful to have members of the Cabinet appear before joint sessions of the Congress to answer written and verbal questions"?

Answer: Jimmy Carter, now president.

They spoke before their election. You will find the first comment in Mondale's book, *The Accountability of Power*, the second in Carter's book, *Why Not the Best?* Neither has referred to the matter since, as far as I know. I only raise it now because the two English-speaking countries that are closest to us and that practice the question-period system are simultaneously holding elections.

Americans are constantly looking over the fence, half enviously, at their parliamentary neighbors' quaint political ways. Here, for example, is a comparison. Canada goes to the polls May 22; the entire election campaign lasts only 60 days. Britain votes May 3; the campaign lasts only five weeks. By contrast, the US election campaign lasts about a year (if it ever stops); the first Iowa caucus in 1980 comes in January. Like a baseball World Series that continued all year, it is terribly boring. That is one reason, perhaps, why our turnout is so miserable: only about half the voters voted last time. In England and Canada 70 or 80 percent will turn out.

The United States has a special blind spot about Canada. We have never learned to look north. If we did we should learn a lot. Canada laid the foundation for a successful national health care system in 1966, and the US is still squabbling about it and may for years to come. Or take the question of voter registration. "Postcard registration" is still a matter of debate in the US; if we had looked up to Canada in the past week we would have noted the urban enumerators out listing the 14,500,000 eligible voters of the nation, all registered at government expense. (Canada would be alarmed if only half the eligibles voted.)

Our system of divided government has worked very well. We are the richest nation on earth. But it hasn't worked the way the Founding Fathers expected, and there are doubts about it now. Can it be improved? Just last week at a press conference (overshadowed by the Harrisburg nuclear scare), Jimmy Carter gravely told editors, "there is a great doubt among the American people about the adequacy of government."

The Founding Fathers thought they were setting up a head of state chosen by an elite, Electoral College, and George Washington might very well have set the precedent for being the ceremonial head. Alexander Hamilton seemed to be a kind of prime minister. In January 1790, Hamilton told the House he was ready to report on his big plan to support the public credit—should he do it orally (parliamentary style) or in writing? The House decided, after a brief debate, that perhaps he should do it in writing. It was a significant precedent. A couple of years later Hamilton asked again if it wouldn't be wiser for him and Secretary of War Knox to come up personally and explain that nasty matter of the defeat of General St. Clair by the Indians. Some thought yes, others thought no, and the latter won. Those were malleable days. I guess messrs. Mondale and Carter would have voted yes.

There are other sharp differences between the two political systems that can be studied during the current elections. Americans elect a president first and find out about him afterward. Who really knew Jimmy Carter till he entered the White House? England and Canada, by contrast, have clear alternatives; all the candidates have been actually tried in parliament; the parties are distinct. In Canada, for example, federal election money goes to the parties, not the candidates. The weakening of the American party structure is one of the greatest changes of our time.

Again, British-Canadian voters know that their next prime minister can serve indefinitely; there is no two-term limitation (passed here by Republicans as posthumous revenge against FDR). Trudeau already has served 11 years. Trudeau is head of government, not head of state. It is such an informal post that when he goes out he is normally attended by only one RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) for bodyguard. (Harry Truman used to saunter out from the White House for morning strolls, but he was the last one to escape.)

Eisenhower questioned the two-term limitation. He told *New York Times* man Russell Baker at a press conference in 1956, "The United States ought to be able to choose for its President anybody that it wants, regardless of the number of terms he has served."

Another big difference between the two systems is that Thatcher or Trudeau, Callaghan or Joe Clark, will be familiar with and able to work with the legislature from the start. The new prime minister is already seated in the legislature and so is his cabinet. Our system of divided power makes for an almost ceaseless struggle with Congress. About a third of the time in modern days we have split government here, one party controlling the legislature, the other the executive. Suppose Carter had introduced his energy bill in Parliament, which didn't act on it. He would have had a showdown at once: a vote of confidence. Today nobody knows who's in charge. Our divided system worked all right when it took a fortnight to ride from Boston to Washington, but now a two-year delay in an energy package is dangerous.

In the House of Commons on the night of March 28, Callaghan demanded a vote of confidence and the tally wavered back and forth, finally settling at 311 to 310. With a possibility like that, politics is breathless.

Then there's another difference in our contrasting governments. All three nations call their legislatures "bicameral," but while the upper houses in England and Canada have atrophied, the US Senate has swelled. The governor general appoints members of the Canadian upper chamber (who must retire at 75). In England it was once written affectionately that "the House of Peers / Throughout the war / Did nothing in particular / And did it very well."

But look at our Senate! The SALT II treaty may come up soon. Thirty-four Senators out of a Congress of 535 can defeat it; defeat it as a Senate minority did the League of Nations in 1919-20, although a majority at all times favored it. That's power for you.

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Correspondence

Profound parable

To the editors:

Reviewing Paul Shrader's film, *Hardcore* (*TNR*, March 3), Stanley Kauffmann asks "What's the point of it all?" He missed the synecdoche: Schrader draws a subtle but close parallel between Jake Van Dorn's search for his daughter and God's search for his children. As George C. Scott, playing the hardcore Calvinist, explains, the acronym TULIP encapsulates the major portion of Christian doctrine—a sovereign God irresistibly redeeming some of mankind from a depraved world. Kauffmann asks why and how Jake Van Dorn could have become part of the porno subculture. It wasn't easy; nor was God's incarnation. Had he viewed the film from a Calvinist's perspective, Kauffmann would have realized also the *necessity* of the daughter's return to and with her father. After all, consider the alternative. Why was there no wife or mother? Draw your own conclusions.

The film left me awed, excited, and grateful for Shrader's skillful use of the medium to tell a profound parable.

Wilbur Mellema
San Jose, California

Alternatives to the welfare state

To the editors:

Apparently Glenn Tinder has chosen to emulate the ways of the ostrich in his defense of the welfare state (*TNR*, March 10). How else can one explain that while claiming the welfare state "symbolizes the idea that government should serve justice," he utterly ignores assorted criticisms of a "libertarian" stripe—surely not all of them obviously disreputable—according to which that type of state is fundamentally unjust?

Again, why does he not even pretend to argue for his underlying view that only the welfare state is capable of instituting "kindness and compassion" within the public realm? Is it because he unquestioningly identified the "public" with the "governmental" or "state-sponsored"? At any rate, he does not even consider the possibility that what the government does in the way of promoting kindness and compassion (as distinct from justice) in the welfare state, might well be attempted within the framework of a purely capitalist minimal state by the family; the community; charitable, educational, cultural, religious organizations; and other private (non-governmental) yet public (social) institutions. Any objection against the latter scenario on the grounds that "it wouldn't work very well" is, first, hardly open to Tinder and, second, appreciably weakened by the fact that a humane minimal-state society has not had the historical chance to develop, having been preempted (for reasons good and bad) by the growth of statist welfarism.

Mykolas J. Drunga
Boston, Massachusetts

Splendid sorrow

To the editors:

Most journalists reach their embalmers without even drawing the attention of Ronald Radosh, and I owe you thanks for allotting six column feet of *The New Republic* to his splendid sorrow over my and Jim Aronson's *Something to Guard* and its subject, the *National Guardian* of 1948-1967.

I appreciate his grief about "the steep price we paid" for publishing *National Guardian*: 24 years too late, but better than never. By our reading of the First Amendment even people as monstrous and lunatic as he evidently considers us may publish a paper without being inquisited, jailed and deported; and if such a thing happens not only monsters and lunatics are called upon to protest, but respectable professors, best-selling writers, mass-circulation newspapers and liberal weeklies.

Cedric Belfrage
Cuernavaca Morelos, Mexico

Stevenson and son

To the editors:

In your editorial "Son of Egghead" (*TNR*, February 24) you wrote: "Stevenson's ruminations are almost a parody of his father's fabled indecision when faced with the same question [running for president]. . . ." Please don't perpetuate the myth that Governor Stevenson was indecisive. He told President Truman, who encouraged him to run in January 1952, that he did not want to run. He told others as the Convention approached the very same thing. He was decisive about it, but myth-makers like Truman could not comprehend anyone not wanting to run for president.

Governor Stevenson was most decisive about running for the office in 1956. After his second defeat he announced that he would not be a candidate for the nomination in 1960, nor would he support any candidate. Despite mounting pressures from Kennedy and Johnson to support their individual candidates, Stevenson remained decisive about not supporting any candidate.

The governor was a thoughtful person who studied issues and above all was not impetuous. So is his son.

Walter Johnson
Editor of The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii

Kublai Khan

To the editors:

Please tell Murray Sayle (*TNR*, March 24) that Kublai Khan was the grandson and not the son of Genghis Khan.

James L. Becker
St. Louis, Missouri

A quaint review

To the editors:

How quaint of Geoffrey Barraclough to review John Kenneth Galbraith's book, *The Nature of Mass Poverty*, as if it were a study of third world economics (*TNR*, March 24). A more interesting approach would be to treat it as a proposal to the Hyannisport Pretender. Look at its possible consequences. Teddy is elected president in 1980 and announces that funds spent in the South Bronxes of America would be included in the foreign aid budget. That item swells and Pierre Salinger writes about how the US is seriously shouldering its international responsibilities. Herman Badillo is made ambassador to the undocumented. The residents of East Los Angeles ask for a health clinic and F-4s. Califano says that the health clinic would have to wait until the finishing touches are put on a national health insurance plan. Beverly Hills asks for Hawk missiles and appoints an ambassador to Saudi Arabia, etc. Mr. Barraclough seems to have forgotten that Galbraith is also a novelist.

Steve Adler
Brooklyn, New York

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

Comparative Financial Review

	Years ended December 31, 1977	1976
Income		
Life premiums	$22,340,297	$16,150,742
Accident and health premiums	25,683,413	23,593,214
Investment and other income	4,799,481	4,090,525
Total income	52,823,191	43,834,481
Benefits and expenses		
Life claims and other benefits	4,126,231	3,735,055
Accident and health claims	12,430,024	11,644,002
Increase in liability for future policy benefits	12,196,239	8,711,984
Amortization of policy acquisition costs	5,183,133	4,431,061
Commissions	5,943,151	5,224,771
General expenses and insurance taxes	5,869,697	5,652,642
Dividends to policyholders	298,064	299,032
	46,046,539	39,698,547
Income before income taxes and realized investment gains (losses)	6,776,652	4,135,934
Provision for income taxes		
Current	—	—
Deferred	1,909,150	1,209,252
Income before realized investment gains (losses)	4,867,502	2,926,682
Realized investment gains (losses)	11,364	356,057
Net income	$ 4,878,866	$ 3,282,739
Earnings per share		
Income before realized investment gains (losses)	$ 2.88	$ 1.76
Realized investment gains (losses)	.01	.21
Net income	$ 2.89	$ 1.97

Assets	$116,000,000
Insurance in Force	$1,289,599,000

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

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Cover: Three political philosophers attempt to guide the body politic. Ronald Dworkin discusses Robert Nozick, John Rawls and himself, beginning on page 41. Drawing by Vint Lawrence.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

April 14, 1979

The Moral Equivalent of Verdun

In the endless trench warfare over nuclear power, the proponents gained a few yards earlier this year by capitalizing on the Pahlavi Memorial Oil Panic. Now, under cover of last week's accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, opponents have recovered that ground and advanced some distance. The infantry on both sides are as intrepid as they are ignorant, and there is no hope of victory for either side soon.

Nuclear energy is a classic illustration of our present political paralysis. It is an important social decision that is not being made, while the costs of indecision are probably greater than the costs of a wrong decision either way. Either the benefit to be derived from nuclear power is worth the risks and costs, or it is not. This is not a decision that any citizen can sensibly make for himself or herself, because the facts are too complex. Nor is it a decision that we can sensibly leave to the forces of the marketplace, since the risks are imposed upon others besides those who enjoy the benefits. It is a decision we must rely on the government to make for us, and the government has declined to make it, and make it stick.

Instead of deciding about nuclear power once and for all, the government permits proponents to spend millions applying for and building power plants; then it permits opponents to keep the plants from operation by litigating the same questions again and again before state and federal agencies and courts. Meanwhile the utilities and the corporations involved put off the search for alternative energy sources, but the nuclear option remains elusive.

The call has gone out for a "blue ribbon commission" to assess the nuclear option in light of the Pennsylvania Syndrome; the *New York Times* urges that it include poets as well as nuclear engineers. This is a temptation no president can be expected to resist, so let there be a commission. But let it be small; let it include no lawyers; let it be hasty; let it deny due process to both sides (no cross-country hearings) and let it make up its mind based on the voluminous evidence already available. Let it write a *short* report (no dissents, please). And let Congress, acting on its recommendation, pass legislation either sharply curtailing the federal regulatory process and overriding state deliberations, or banning the damned things for good.

Of course if a blue-ribbon commission can actually settle this issue, we will be forced to wonder what the Energy Department, with its 20,000 employees and 910 pages of consultants, has been doing for the last two years. The nuclear mess is probably the worst example of our energy stalemate, but not the only example.

The sand on which Carter built his energy house is the notion that we are rapidly running out of oil and natural gas. That wasn't true two years ago, and it isn't true now. Since Carter unveiled his program, the abundance of world oil supplies has been dramatically illustrated by the discovery of new natural gas fields in western Canada, the opening of China's large holdings to development, and most important, the ever-increasing estimates of Mexican oil reserves. Mexico has greater estimated reserves than any nation in the world—including Saudi Arabia. Carter relied partly on a now discredited CIA report which predicted, among other things, that the Soviet Union soon would become a net importer of oil, thus increasing pressure on Western supplies. But Soviet bloc nations have nearly half of the world's proven reserves, and by one estimate Siberia alone has six times as much petroleum as Saudi Arabia. Natural gas supplies are especially abundant. At its current consumption rate, the US has enough domestic natural gas reserves to last 10 centuries. In the last six years, new discoveries of petroleum have exceeded consumption; we have more fuel now than we did when the "energy crisis" began.

The administration made several errors in reaching the conclusion that world fuel supplies were on the verge of depletion. First was the presumption that proven reserves represented all the oil and gas that could ever be extracted. The administration also assumed wrongly that petroleum, despite its rising cost, would account for an increasing share of energy consumption for the foreseeable future. But since OPEC quadrupled oil prices in 1973-74, the share of the

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world's energy derived from petroleum has fallen by six percent—after growing steadily for the previous two decades.

Influenced mostly by James Schlesinger, Carter set out to address these fictional problems. Schlesinger thought that since the world was running out of oil and natural gas, it would be futile to concentrate on encouraging more production; sometimes he even insisted that there was no way to increase production anyway.

The preoccupation of Carter and Schlesinger with the imminent exhaustion of the world's petroleum supplies has distracted the country from coming to grips with the serious energy problems that do exist. The most important problem is the existence of an international petroleum cartel, namely OPEC. OPEC's position as the world's main supplier of oil is dangerous and unhealthy. It is politically dangerous because it allows a few small countries to threaten a sudden reduction of supplies to the US or the West as a whole. It is economically unhealthy because even without an embargo, OPEC holds the price of oil above what it would be in a competitive market. It imposes heavy costs on the economies of Western nations. These costs inhibit economic growth and lower living standards. The effect on poor nations is disastrous.

The US should take measures to weaken or cripple OPEC, but at the same time it should recognize and publicize OPEC's own limitations. So far Carter's policy has been just the opposite: take no action against OPEC, but live in fear of it. True, OPEC is a cartel and was able to quadruple the price of oil in 1973-74. But that huge boost in price was OPEC's first and only impressive display of strength, and it isn't likely to be repeated. Even cartels have to obey economic laws. The events of 1973-74 raised prices to roughly the level where OPEC earned the highest possible revenues. If they had been raised much higher, consumption would have fallen enough to lower earnings. Since then OPEC's prices have been remarkably stable: even considering the latest round of increases, the world price of oil has risen since 1974 from $10.95 to about $15.50, an increase of 42 percent, less than the 48 percent inflation that has occurred in the US. We needn't be grateful for any alleged "restraint." There is no evidence to suggest that OPEC can substantially increase the real price of oil.

Nor is the threat of another embargo as real as is commonly believed. OPEC probably can't enforce a selective embargo against the US, because it has no control over where its oil goes after it leaves the Middle East. During the last embargo, the oil companies simply shifted around their own supplies to fill the gap left in the US market. The only way the US can be embargoed effectively is through an embargo of all Western nations or a sharp reduction in OPEC production. A total embargo would hurt the OPEC countries as much as the West. In 1973-74, OPEC countries didn't have the large investments in the industrialized Western countries that they do now. Anything they do now to create economic chaos in the West threatens their own interests there.

President Carter should boost the morale of the US and the rest of the Western world by frankly saying that OPEC's power is mostly bluff. Just persuading people of that would change the international petroleum equation by making consumers more resistant to extortion. There are more concrete measures available too. Professor Morris Adelman of MIT has been pushing for years an elegant system that would force oil producers to bid secretly for the right to sell oil in the US. This would undermine the cartel by encouraging individual countries to cheat on the OPEC price. A foolish loophole in the Internal Revenue Code now gives the oil companies a better tax deal on oil they import than on oil they produce domestically. This is essentially a US government subsidy to the OPEC countries, and should be ended.

The biggest failure of our energy policy, bigger even than the nuclear stalemate, is the stalemate over the price of oil and natural gas. We cannot control what we pay for imported oil, but we can control what we pay domestic oil and gas producers, and what consumers pay for oil and gas products. Instead of setting these dials to balance the needs of fairness and efficiency, the government has twisted them back and forth in response to the political winds and its own perception that the world is about to run dry.

Right now the government controls the price refiners pay producers for domestic oil. The control price can be as little as a third of the world price, depending on when a particular well was drilled. An impossibly complicated system of "entitlements" attempts to insure that all refiners get about the same mix of cheap domestic and expensive imported oil. The government also directly controls the price of gasoline at the pump. And it pleads earnestly for conservation, while holding the constant threat of rationing over all involved if they don't behave. The result is that consumers probably pay somewhat less for oil products than they would without controls, and use somewhat more. Producers produce somewhat less than they would if they could get the OPEC price, cheat whenever they can on the controls and entitlements, and complain bitterly about government interference.

An ideal oil pricing policy should attempt to achieve four things. (Similar principles apply to natural gas.) First, consumers should be forced to pay the full, extortionate OPEC-level price for all oil products. Every additional barrel of consumption, after all, requires an additional barrel of imports. Hiding this fact from consumers encourages excess consumption and tightens the OPEC hammerlock.

Second, domestic producers (who still account for almost half our oil) should not be able to get the OPEC

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price for oil that costs them less than that to pull from the ground. We cannot, for the moment, prevent OPEC from extracting monopoly profits from the world's consumers, but we can and should, as a matter of fairness, hold domestic producers to a more reasonable profit.

Third, domestic producers should be encouraged to pump any oil that can be brought out of the ground profitably for less than the world price. Any price control that holds them to less than OPEC is getting means there is American oil sitting in the ground that would be cheaper than what we're paying our extortioners.

Fourth, the poorest citizens should not have to suffer undue hardship as a result of OPEC's extortion or our own policies to combat it. We cannot agree with the *Wall Street Journal* that it is enough to say, as that paper said last week, "People who save [energy] need pay no more for energy; they need only suffer some reduction in living standards."

In theory, there is a way to reconcile these four principles. Ending all price controls would raise consumer prices to the world level. A so-called "wellhead tax" on domestic oil—set at the difference between the cost of production (including a fair profit) and the world price—would keep domestic producers from enjoying the benefits of the cartel. Since the tax would get smaller as the cost of production approached the OPEC price, it would not discourage domestic production that could economically replace imports. And the tax revenues could be used to help the poor bear this and all their other burdens.

The practical difficulty of such an arrangement is figuring out how much each barrel of oil actually costs to produce. The current price control system differentiates "old" oil from "new" oil and "new new" oil, based on what well each comes from. This ignores the fact that more expensive methods can extract new oil from old wells. But a wellhead tax need not be as complicated as the current controls-and-entitlements fiasco. Nevertheless, any attempt to capture *all* the oil companies' windfall profits would be a genuine administrative thicket, and might well interfere with the really important goal of increasing domestic production to undermine OPEC. We think a tax can be devised to capture most of this windfall, with minimal administrative burden. In return for their partial windfall, we would expect domestic oil producers to make good *post haste* on all their bleating about the invigorating effect of freedom from controls.

President Carter's latest energy pronouncement (examined in detail in this week's "White House Watch" column) brings us part of the way toward these goals. He has started a phased decontrol of oil prices, and has left the burden on Congress (where it belongs) to come up with a tax to prevent windfall profits and a rebate to help the poor. But why has it taken so long? One reason is Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, recently described by a Washington sage as the man who destroyed the myth that you must be smart just because you smoke a pipe. Schlesinger invented his own job and then got it because of his reputation for being smart, not because of any expertise about energy, of which he admitted to having none. The condition of the Energy Department after two years, and of our energy policy itself, is a powerful antidote to the cult of the manager. Schlesinger has managed a real botch. Now that President Carter has traded in his energy policy for a more efficient model, he should do the same with his energy secretary.

White House Watch

Getting Up Energy

The only true hard-head among the people who principally contributed to the President's big energy speech—his first attempt since the dismal effort of April 1977 to define and present a coherent national energy policy—was the President. From the start of preliminary discussion several weeks ago, he knew essentially what he wanted and insisted, at times brutally, that the five Cabinet secretaries and staff assistants on whom he chiefly relied come up with ideas and alternatives that would enable him to do, say and get what he wanted.

Three relative hard-heads among the five, hard-headed in the sense that they held and initially stated firm beliefs in a firm way, were Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger, and budget director James T. McIntyre Jr. The other two leading advisers, domestic policy chief Stuart Eizenstat and Chairman Charles Schultze of the Council of Economic Advisers, had strong views, too. But from the beginning they worked for consensus, probably understood sooner than the others did what the President was after, and so seemed in the pre-speech accounts of what went on to bend more easily and quickly to Carter's preferences than their compatriots did.

The most interesting of the accounts from within concern Carter. They make him appear to be more incisive, more demanding, more commanding than he usually makes himself appear to be. Soon after the Egypt-Israel treaty was signed and Carter turned back from Mideast problems to his deferred energy speech and policy, Press Secretary Jody Powell made the extraordinary disclosure at a public news briefing that the President at a meeting with some of his advisers had

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

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expressed strong dissatisfaction with the suggestions offered him. Schlesinger, by the nature of his job the President's chief energy counsellor, was assumed to be Carter's main target. He wasn't.

The story of that explosion—and it was an explosion—is revealing. One of the energy questions Carter had to settle was whether to ask Congress for some sort of special tax that would at least curtail the increased profits that the oil companies would otherwise get from steadily rising gasoline and fuel oil prices. Carter knew that he was going to be speaking just before the major companies announced high, in some instances record, 1978 profits. The thought of announcing measures that were bound to increase prices and therefore profits without some form of tax recovery for public benefit stuck in his craw. Congressional leaders and his own advisers had reminded him that Congress in 1977 and 1978 refused to enact any sort of recovery tax and some of them told him that he had a poor chance of getting any sort of tax this year. He snarled that there had to be ways to improve the chances of getting a satisfactory tax if only his people put their minds to the problem instead of just telling him how tough it would be. The result of the complaint, aimed at a dozen or so senior officials at the meeting and through them at their assistants, was one of the major proposals prepared for the speech. A special energy trust fund, derived from extra revenues expected to increase from $1.5 billion to five billion dollars a year by fiscal 1983, would be earmarked for poor Americans (maybe through something like increased food-stamp allotments instead of a complicated rebate system), mass transit to reduce automobile use, such alternative sources as solar energy and gasoline-alcohol mixtures, and direct incentives for increased domestic oil and natural gas production. This part of the package was designed to make the sort of tax Carter wanted as attractive as possible to as wide a spectrum of congressional, public and private interest opinion as possible.

Carter determined not only the content of the speech but the manner of delivery. So much of the speech was bound to be devoted to technical, inherently dull factors that chief imagist Gerald Rafshoon, among others, advocated a low-key forum—perhaps even a written statement and a message to Congress rather than a speech—instead of the nationally televised performance that the media had been led to expect. An exaggerated news report that Carter would not speak on television led to the television address. How that happened says much about Carter.

The President hadn't really thought about how to do it until the news story appeared. The story itself didn't bother him. An instant uproar from Congress, reflecting a larger congressional concern than the mode of address, bothered him greatly. Representatives and senators high and low, of all parties and factions, were determined that Jimmy Carter and not they as individuals and Congress as an institution bear the energy monkey. They were sick of Carter's first denouncing Congress for not enacting his 1977 energy program and then claiming that it had enacted more of that program than it actually had. Decontrol of controlled domestic crude oil prices was known to be near. Higher gasoline prices, already jacked by OPEC increases in imported oil prices, were certain to result. Some form of compensatory tax, equally sure to be opposed by the oil companies and to be denounced as insufficient by environmentalists and consumerists, was headed from Carter to Congress. So the message from the Hill to him was, it's your thing. Don't try to make it ours. The report that he had decided to announce his revised energy program in the quietest possible way made members of Congress think he was passing the buck to them. They told him so. He went for television, in an address that originally was to have been broadcast March 29 and was postponed to April 5.

There's a ludicrous footnote to this part of the story. *The New York Times* of April 3—the day the networks were told the President intended to speak the night of the 5th—front-paged a fairly detailed and accurate account of what he'd say. Carter, who has been hypersensitive recently to news leaks concerning his plans, was furious. Rafshoon was furious. He expressed his and Carter's fury to Cabinet-level officials who had met for a discussion of the energy proposals. It was rumored at the White House that Rafshoon had said that Carter's thunder had been stolen; he might as well forget television and just issue a statement. That was an exaggeration. But the fury was real. It was evidence of how uptight some of the Carter people were. *The Washington Post* printed another detailed account on the 4th. All hands survived.

Before Carter and his advisers got to such details as the medium and to such particulars as the proposed energy trust fund, several basic issues had to be resolved. That's where the secondary hard-heads—Blumenthal, Schlesinger and McIntyre—who were mentioned at the start of this report came in. Under a law enacted under Gerald Ford and expiring September 30, 1981, Carter as of June 1 has the power to decontrol, completely or in part and by phases, the controlled prices of most (not all) domestically produced crude oil. The hitherto repressed prices would rise toward ever-rising world levels and, to hear the companies tell it, would substantially encourage new domestic exploration and production, thus reducing or at least holding down imports. Carter believes this would happen and it's at the core of his policy. He and everybody he listened to during the pre-speech debates was for some degree of decontrol on and after June 1. Blumenthal and Schlesinger advocated immediate, total decontrol. Carter indicated right off that he wouldn't buy that but was for phased decontrol beginning June 1 and to be completed by September 30, 1981. Once they took this

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in, Blumenthal and Schlesinger advocated the fastest feasible pace—"path" is the cherished White House term—of phased decontrol with the largest feasible percentage increases in the permitted ceilings at each stage, all to be completed by a date certain—maybe even before September 30, 1981. McIntyre and his chief energy assistant at the budget bureau, Eliot Cutler, urged a more cautious approach. Begin decontrol June 1, yes, but don't commit the President to completing it by any date certain and thus retain full presidential control over the process. With this approach he might suspend the whole process of decontrol when and if the rate of inflation or other political or economic facts indicated. McIntyre also urged Carter to tell Congress flatly that it couldn't have decontrol by presidential action unless it assured him the compensatory tax he wanted. In short—no tax, no decontrol. Carter obviously liked the principle of open options and retained control. But he went for a commitment to decontrol by a date certain and accepted the congressional and other advice that he'd almost certainly get no tax if he seemed to insult Congress by making decontrol contingent upon a tax. Behind much of this strategy was a piece of sound though rather cynical reasoning. Regardless of what he orally committed himself to, he'd retain the authority under present law to suspend decontrol until the expiration date of September 30, 1981.

Charles Schultze, who was urging phased decontrol long before Carter began the current energy review, and Stuart Eizenstat initially urged still a third course. They didn't press it after Carter's preference for a clear commitment to decontrol by a date certain became clear. They advocated a much more gradual "path" of decontrol in very modest stages, extending beyond 1981 perhaps into 1985. Along with this course they argued for strong tax and other incentives for increased domestic exploration and production and—one of Schultze's favorite devices—maximum use of the president's powers under existing law to reclassify some domestic oil production and permit price increases without formal decontrol. Carter bought much of it but not the prolonged extension.

Decontrolling the prices of domestic crude oil has nothing to do with decontrolling the retail prices of gasoline and fuel oils. Forty-three national associations of independent marketers of petroleum products protested by telegram to Carter on April 4 against decontrolling domestic crude oil prices while retaining "a costly, incomprehensible and utterly worthless gasoline regulatory system on thousands of small marketers." The marketers bespoke their own interest, of course. But it's clearly true that an incredibly complex system of retail gasoline controls does not prevent remorseless increases in retail gasoline prices.

A plus for the current review as compared with Carter's 1977 energy performance should be noted. The 1977 fiasco was devised in total secrecy, at a forced and ruinous pace, by a tiny crew headed by Schlesinger, with no consultation whatsoever, even within the White House establishment. This year there was the widest conceivable consultation, at reasonable leisure, with independent experts, members and leaders of Congress, industry and other private interest groups. Carter people who read final drafts of the speech found vast yawnful expanses in it and wished it could be delivered in a sealed cave.

John Osborne

A cure for the water shortage.

Add Water and Stir

America today faces the quickly approaching menace of a nationwide water shortage, a direct result of our highly modernized and consumer-oriented culture. The nation's daily rate of water consumption was estimated in 1975 at 106.6 billion gallons. Agricultural and industrial demands account for the greater part of this incredible figure; the consumer is responsible for the rest. As sprinkler systems across the country keep our lawns and golf courses green, our supply of groundwater rapidly diminishes. Although numerous research foundations are searching for alternative sources, Americans must take measures to prevent the total depletion of the available water supply. Such luxuries as swimming pools, car washes and dishwashers continually siphon from our diminishing resources. But the greatest single instrument of water wastage is the American bathroom.

The average American home has at least two bathrooms, a reflection of our culture's obsession with cleanliness and personal appearance. Bathing and toilet-flushing account for almost three-fourths of the water used within the household. Let us suppose that a typical American spends 10 minutes taking a shower each day. Most shower heads deliver five to six gallons per minute. Multiply the number of gallons wasted in a single shower by millions and the numbers are astronomical.

Unfortunately, it is unreasonable to ask the American public to reduce its weekly consumption of showers. The shower has become too much an integrated part of our society: it relaxes, revitalizes, massages and stimulates. In many ways, it is as addictive as tobacco or alcohol.

Toilets, too, extravagantly waste water. Each individual flushes away approximately 29 gallons of water per day. Although one may insert flow-

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restrictors, immense water wastage is unavoidable.

If drastic measures are not taken soon, we will be forced to sacrifice our washing machines and sprinklers in order to maintain our bathing habits. But there is one efficient and inexpensive solution to this problem. Obviously, we must use the remaining water supply to its fullest extent, avoiding all possible wastage. In doing so, we must continue to meet the demand of the American public. These two prerequisites can be met by remodeling the plumbing systems of our homes.

The main feature of a more sensible design would be that one toilet per house would be connected to the main sewer line. This toilet would be used for bodily disposal other than urination. The other toilet's pipes would be redirected to a large underground tank in the backyard. These toilets could be used only for urination. The accumulated mixture of water and urine (approximately 90 percent and 10 percent respectively) would be filtered through a layer of organic substance and then piped back through the house into the showers. Thus the same water would serve a double purpose, eliminating the extreme wastefulness of the present system.

The benefits of this newly devised method are several. Water-urine showers are healthier and less frequently necessary than normal bathing. Scientists have found that the urea present in the urine works as a natural skin moisturizer. Diluted with water this urea gently softens the skin tissues. There will no longer be a need for costly lotions and creams. These commonly used products only clog the pores and make one feel greasy and dirty. Without them, perhaps some will feel less compelled to shower so frequently.

Indirectly, the new type of bathing will improve the rapidly deteriorating American diet. Various kinds of food and drink can produce substantial differences in an individual's urine. Healthy, wholesome foods and a large quantity of water work the most effectively to produce beneficial acids in the urine. This will certainly motivate families to return to well-balanced diets.

Some might wonder about the pungent, acrid odor produced by the urine. But they can be assured that the vast amount of water used to dilute the original substance mellows that sharp smell. After two weeks of daily exposure, one will grow accustomed to the new scent, just as one adapts to the odd odor and smell of mineral water. It is possible that many will acquire a liking for the scent. This could eventually open up an entire market for urine-based soaps and colognes.

This newly devised plumbing system is our only plausible solution to the water shortage problem. Our only other alternative would be to ask Americans to (1) wash their dishes by hand; (2) limit their loads of laundry; and (3) take fewer showers. These alternatives are needlessly stringent, and probably unattainable due to the nature of American society. Such luxuries have become a necessity to our "clean-conscience" culture.

I personally refrain from taking showers. I prefer to bathe in the mountain stream that runs through my property. In this manner, I am refreshed, stimulated and cleansed. But the aforementioned water plan best suits the needs of the general American public.

Mary Louise Weber

Mary Louise Weber lives in western Massachusetts and writes on environmental issues.

Can interest group coalitions increase the political power of the left?

Coalesce Is More

As a remedy for the labor movement's declining political clout, progressive unions are turning to grand coalitions with activists from groups representing consumers, women, environmentalists, minorities and rural citizens. Such coalitions raise the hope of building a grassroots progressive movement strong enough to make or break candidates and legislation. But so far, groups like the Progressive Alliance, the Citizen Labor Energy Coalition and the Coalition Opposed to Inflation in the Necessities are not much more than stationery letterheads.

The present round of coalition building began with the 1976 presidential election, when nine liberal unions formed the Labor Coalition. The unions involved were the State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the Communications Workers, the Graphic Arts, the Machinists, the Electrical Workers, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, the National Education Association, the Auto Workers and the Mine Workers. The six AFL-CIO unions joined the group partly because they were frustrated by the domination of the AFL by the building trades unions, many of which share George Meany's distrust of anyone not like them—the young, women, leftists, environmentalists—and Meany's basic philosophy that what's good for business is good for workers.

The Labor Coalition worked hard to push the Democratic party to adopt a progressive platform. It also provided early support for Jimmy Carter's candidacy. Some saw him as a populist. Others claimed that only a southerner could beat George Wallace and then beat the Republicans.

Once Carter and the overwhelmingly Democratic Congress had been elected, it became clear that liberal unions hadn't gotten much in return for their support. The party platform was quickly discarded. Carter had

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

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said, for example, that he was "for" national health insurance and tax reform, but the hard bargaining over details was left until after the election, when the unions no longer had much negotiating strength. President Carter abandoned a comprehensive approach to national health insurance, signed a tax cut bill that gave most of its relief to the well-off and set up a Regulatory Council that threatened to roll back gains made in environmental protection and occupational safety and health regulation. Democratic members of Congress, too, saw that they only had to stay one step to the left of the Republicans to keep labor's support.

As the political obituaries for labor were being written, the liberal unions decided to see whether the liberal groups that had helped elect Carter and the Democratic Congress could exert more pressure by marching under collective banners than they could individually.

The UAW took the most ambitious step, convening a Progressive Alliance of more than 100 groups, including several dozen unions and left-liberal organizations such as Friends of the Earth, the National Organization for Women, the NAACP, and the Consumer Federation of America. The Alliance has issued statements attacking Carter's budget cuts for social programs and supporting attempts to tighten Senate rules on filibuster tactics. Many of the same groups are also allied as the Citizen Labor Energy Coalition, which is headed by Machinists president William Winpisinger. CLEC was an active, though unsuccessful, lobbyist against deregulation of natural gas. Another regrouping of the labor-liberal allies, COIN, was founded by the Machinists, Operating Engineers and several consumer groups. It has lobbied Carter and inflation czar Alfred Kahn to limit the rising costs of health care, housing, energy and food. COIN says these account for 70 percent of the household budget for 80 percent of American families.

Business has achieved its recent political successes in part because of increased grassroots organization. Many of the major business lobbying groups now have watchdog committees and networks of key contacts in each congressional district, ready to make phone calls when the signal comes from Washington. Politicians are regularly invited to business gatherings where they can be lobbied directly by their constituents.

In theory, the unions have even more people who can be mobilized in the cause of the new coalitions. But internal politics affects union behavior much more than it affects business groups. Some union leaders see their own rank and file as a sleeping giant, which they are reluctant to waken. They're afraid that, once aroused against the politicians outside the union, the giant could turn inward. Most of the liberal unions are not much more democratic than the conservative unions. For example, many of the leaders now involved in the Progressive Coalition have worked hard to maintain systems in which union officers are elected at tightly controlled conventions rather than by membership referendum. The two leading liberal unionists, Douglas Fraser of the UAW and Winpisinger of the Machinists, assumed their posts through internal maneuvering which eliminated all opposition by the time the voting occurred. Encouraging grassroots participation in political processes raises unwanted questions.

The Mine Workers' leadership learned this lesson after experiments beginning in 1973, with a grassroots political action campaign. As in most unions, lobbying endorsing political candidates traditionally had been the job of top officials. This allowed the officers to bolster their own political positions by displaying their close relationships with the powerful. But it also meant that politicians suspected they would pay no price at the polls if they ignored the officers' advice. To keep winning legislative "victories" without organized power, the officers would settle for compromises which often would have been unacceptable to the rank and file had they been able to look over their lobbyists' shoulders.

As part of a general reform effort within the union, the UMW set up a new political action structure, with local and state councils made up of rank-and-file workers elected by the local unions. These councils interviewed candidates for political office and reviewed their records before making endorsements. In some cases, the councils began to reject the tradition of endorsing mediocre candidates merely because they were most likely to win. Council members became active in successful state and national lobbying campaigns featuring marches, rallies and personal visits to legislators. Without rank-and-file lobbying, for example, Congress never would have been persuaded to liberalize, for the second time, the federal compensation program for victims of black lung disease.

But despite the effectiveness of the new system, the UMW leadership began to dismantle it last year. National political and legislative endorsements are back in the hands of the top elected officials, and insiders say the officers would like to weaken the state structures as well. The reason is that new grassroots leaders were developing who could mount internal political challenges. Members were no longer giving the top officers credit for every positive legislative or political development. And politicians were complaining to the union officers about the new pressure.

Even if the unions are willing to mobilize their full rank-and-file strength, the labor-liberal alliances will become major political forces only if they can work out genuine resolutions of policy differences among the allies. In deference to unions whose members work for military contractors, the Progressive Alliance seriously considered omitting any reference to military spending in calling for restoration of budget cuts in social programs. When the Alliance doves finally prevailed, they did so without convincing the hawks, so Carter

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and members of Congress know that the groups do not really speak with any more unity than they did before they called themselves an alliance. The CLEC has tried to affect energy policy without resolving conflicting views on nuclear power. Some of its unions represent nuclear plant construction workers while other coalition members think nuclear power is too dangerous, expensive and capital-intensive. Compromises within the coalitions would require massive education programs and would require union officers to take political risks within their unions. But if common positions cannot be reached, why have alliances at all?

On issues where they do agree, the labor-liberal allies must find ways to develop support outside their ranks. Liberals can appeal honestly to people outside the groups that comprise these coalitions who nevertheless care about fundamental issues like national health insurance and tax reform. The UAW runs excellent articles in its internal publications showing how a national health system could reduce inflation. But it has not taken the message to the nation with advertising or other standard techniques of political campaigning. AFSCME has done some institutional advertising, but it has not put on the kind of coordinated, continuing campaign that would convince angry taxpayers that redistribution of wealth and the tax burden is preferable to cuts in public services. One constraint, again, is internal politics: union leaders are always under pressure from political opponents to spend dues money only on narrowly defined direct service to the membership.

Matt Witt

Matt Witt is director of the American Labor Education Center and editor of *American Labor*.

Executing the former prime minister won't solve his successors' problems.

Pakistan After Bhutto

The nations of southern and western Asia, forming a 2000-mile arc along the southern rim of the Soviet Union, have become a dangerous area of turbulence. First came a Soviet-influenced coup in Afghanistan, then revolution in Iran. Now the region's stability may suffer another serious blow in Pakistan.

The Pakistan's 75 million people are deeply polarized over the execution of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was convicted of ordering the murder of a political adversary. Pakistan's Supreme Court upheld the death sentence by a four-to-three vote in February. It reaffirmed its ruling after a final appeal by Bhutto's lawyers last month, but added a somewhat ambiguous recommendation for clemency. The court decision left Bhutto's life in the hands of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, the country's military ruler. Zia believes in orthodox eye-for-an-eye Islamic law, and once publicly called Bhutto a murderer. He vowed not to spare Bhutto if the Supreme Court approved the execution. The 51-year-old Bhutto refused to ask for clemency or allow his family to do so, claiming that such a request would be an admission of guilt. A request on his behalf was made, however, by leaders of his Pakistan People's party. President Carter, Leonid Brezhnev, Pope John Paul II and China's Communist party chairman Hua Guofeng all asked Zia to commute the sentence and perhaps allow Bhutto to go into exile.

Zia's dilemma was complicated by his promise last month to hold a long-awaited national election in November. Executing Bhutto risked violent turmoil, but leaving him alive meant he would be a formidable force, even from a jail cell, if the election were held.

Pakistan is suffering from many of the same religious, social and political conflicts that fed the revolution in Iran. Muslim fundamentalists are at war with modernism; impoverished laborers and peasants, with a heightened political consciousness that was largely inspired by Bhutto, are challenging the wealthy elite that has traditionally dominated Pakistan's economic and political life. Many different Pakistanis are groping without much success to achieve basic political and human freedoms, denied for most of the country's 31 years of independence.

Bhutto remained Pakistan's most important politician until the end, even though he was in jail for all but a few weeks since his overthrow in July 1977. Bhutto embodied both a personal and a national tragedy: the tragedy of a leader who might have reached greatness but for deep flaws of character, and the tragedy of a country that has suffered more than its share of misrule and still seems far from developing modern, humane, democratic institutions.

The murder case against Bhutto arose from an assassination attempt on November 11, 1974, against Raza Ahmed Kasuri, a former ally who had become one of Bhutto's vocal critics. Kasuri survived the attack but his father was killed. The Lahore High Court, in its verdict last year—Pakistan has no jury trial system—found the shooting was carried out on Bhutto's orders, a charge Bhutto called a "fabrication."

The accusation was not implausible. There was plenty of strong-arm thuggery during the Bhutto regime, much of it documented in a series of white papers issued by his successors. Many abuses were said to have been committed by agents of the Federal Security Force, a paramilitary organization which, Bhutto's foes maintain, was widely used to intimidate

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opponents of his government. Cases cited in the white papers involved beatings, arson and torture, as well as grand-scale corruption among high officials. In one documented case several opposition politicians were arrested, then were freed on bail by a civil court, and then were secretly rounded up and sent to something like a concentration camp in a remote area of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. They were held there illegally until Bhutto's fall.

Yet Bhutto, besides being a repressive dictator, was also the most able and modern-minded leader Pakistan ever has had. Bhutto became prime minister in December 1971, when Pakistan was traumatized by its defeat in the Bangladesh war. Earlier that year, trying unsuccessfully to prevent East Pakistan's secession, the last of the flabby military governments that had ruled Pakistan since the late 1950s turned the army loose on the disaffected Bengali population. The Bangladesh government later claimed that three million people were killed, though this may be an exaggeration. After this massacre, the army was humiliatingly trounced by India.

From the wreckage Bhutto produced what seemed a series of diplomatic and political miracles. He arranged the withdrawal of occupying Indian forces from 5000 square miles of Pakistan's remaining territory and obtained the return of 90,000 war prisoners. He persuaded India not to try 195 captured Pakistani soldiers for atrocities in the east. Two years later Bhutto accomplished what many thought would take a generation, establishing diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. His technique was vintage Bhutto shrewdness: recognition was proclaimed as a gesture to Muslim unity during the Islamic summit conference Bhutto hosted in Lahore. Then he worked to restore trade, communications and finally full diplomatic links with India. Bhutto's international reputation soared.

At home, Bhutto became the first leader in Pakistan's history to seek a political base among the poor rather than in the landowning elite to which he himself belonged. His doctrine of "Islamic Socialism" remained vague, and economic advance was fitful. But Bhutto's rhetoric ended the traditional passivity of Pakistan's poor. "He has given dignity and assertiveness to the people," Malik Bucha, one of his senior advisers, observed several years before Bhutto was overthrown, "and this will not be lost."

But vanity and vindictiveness proved Bhutto's fatal weaknesses. Even when his popularity seemed unassailable, he refused to tolerate dissent. Abuses grew worse while economic growth was slowed by the worldwide recession of the mid-1970s and by Bhutto's own increasingly erratic policies. Newspapers were gagged, opponents harassed or worse. The regime's repressiveness alienated many liberal, educated Pakistanis who might otherwise have supported Bhutto's social and economic reforms. Amid the growing discontent, meanwhile, conservative Muslim leaders, offended by Bhutto's modernism, became more vocal in denouncing him as a traitor to Islam.

In spite of the growing rumblings, Bhutto called national elections for March 1977. They were the first since the 1970 election, when the results were set aside by the generals, precipitating the Bangladesh war. To challenge Bhutto's Pakistan People's party, his opponents formed an ungainly coalition named the Pakistan National Alliance; its nine constituent parties had little in common except their determination to remove Bhutto from power. The alliance showed enough strength that Bhutto's supporters were unwilling to take a chance on an honest vote. Flagrant irregularities were reported on election day: gunmen hustled opposition poll-watchers away from the voting stations, while truckloads of People's party supporters were shuttled from one polling place to another. The results, which showed the government party winning nearly every seat in parliament, were not credible.

Within days, Lahore and other cities were aflame. Gunfire by the army and police did not stop the riots as the 100-degree days of the South Asian summer wore on. Finally the generals had had enough; the loyalty even of their own soldiers was wavering. Bhutto was deposed. After the coup, General Zia proclaimed that a new election would be held and that the military regime would act only as an impartial umpire. He also pledged that full political liberties would be respected. But he could not keep either promise.

An orthodox Muslim himself, Zia was persuaded by religious leaders who, now that Bhutto was gone, turned out to be not so anxious to chance elections after all. Zia, who is universally described as a political *naif* before the coup, also is said to have been genuinely shocked by his discoveries of the abuses committed under Bhutto. And too many officers feared Bhutto's vengeance if he regained power in an election. In the end, plans for a new election were canceled in order, Zia announced, for Bhutto's trial to be concluded. In the meantime, political freedoms were once again sharply curtailed under a series of martial-law regulations.

In prison, Bhutto seemed to regain his popularity as swiftly as he had lost it. A major reason was the floundering indecisiveness of the military regime. Zia's only passionate commitment was to the restoration of Muslim orthodoxy. Prohibition of alcohol—ordered by Bhutto a few months before his fall in an attempt to appease the religious parties—was continued. Criminals were flogged and the Islamic penalty of chopping off the hands of thieves was written into the country's legal code. Such measures may have pleased the mullahs, but they alarmed and embarrassed many other Pakistanis. Women feared, not without reason, that they might be forced back into the *burqa*, the shapeless hooded black robe worn by women in orthodox families, as the clock was turned back on a generation of women's emancipation. And

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

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everywhere, Pakistanis waited in vain for the military government to propose programs for the country's terrible economic problems.

The more the military regime drifted and the more a political settlement receded, the more Bhutto's faults appeared to be forgotten. During his trial, on one of the last occasions on which foreign correspondents were able to talk with him, the former prime minister was as dapper and cocky as ever, but bluntly realistic about the military regime's predicament. "Time is not against us, time is with us," he said. He paused, then added: "Unless, of course, we are eliminated." But even executing Bhutto won't achieve security for the regime or peace for the country.

Arnold Isaacs

Arnold Isaacs, an editor at the *Baltimore Sun*, was that paper's correspondent in Asia for six years.

Just what the world doesn't need—a new profession.

Teaching the Unteachable

by Seth Kupferberg

In 1933 Franklin Roosevelt moved into the White House and set out, as historian William Leuchtenberg put it later, "to create a whole new government." Ardent young planners—"from state agricultural colleges and university campuses, from law faculties and social work schools"—descended on Washington to help develop a New Deal. If FDR were starting out today, he would not need to draw his mandarinate from such a wide variety of disciplines. He could find bright young men and women especially marked out for public service, in the dozens of graduate schools of public policy and public administration that have sprouted up across the country.

Syracuse University started the first American school of public administration back in 1924, and the University of Southern California followed a few years later. But the idea has really come into its own during the 1970s. In 1972 the National Association of Schools of Public Administration boasted 101 affiliates; today it's up to 220. The number of students graduating from such schools each year doubled in the same period—up to 6000 in 1977. That may still be just a trickle next to the flood tide of government bureaucracies. (The federal Department of Energy alone employs 20,000 people.) But it's an increasingly influential and well-regarded trickle. And with growth in the number of university-trained administrators has come insistence that there should be more. Its advocates say special training for public service—suggested by John Stuart Mill in the 1850s—is an idea whose time is overdue.

Harvard president Derek Bok has said repeatedly that Harvard's Kennedy School of Government aims to help create a "new profession": elected, appointed and career officials trained in public policymaking as systematically as corporate executives, doctors and lawyers are trained in their professions. No one says that "nonprofessionals" should be barred from government service, in the way that it's illegal to practice medicine without a license. But to qualify for some jobs—for example, many city managerships—it's already almost essential to have a Master of Public Administration degree. Eighteen months ago President Carter signed an executive order setting up a management intern program to place 250 MPAs a year in federal agencies, with the expectation most of them will transfer to the career civil service after two years. It's the most wide-ranging program so far for bringing professional administrators into government, and it's viewed as something of a pilot.

It is disturbing enough that American democracy is increasingly burdened by the existence of an administrative elite with the kind of influence enjoyed in France by graduates of the prestigious *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*. What is really insidious about the growth of graduate schools in public policy, though, is the assumption that there is such a thing as "public policy" that can be taught and then applied to all the problems of government. It suggests that training in "public policy" is more valuable than a knowledge of petroleum engineering, or of nuclear physics, in

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creating a national energy policy. More important, it suggests that "unbiased" analytical skills can make moral judgments superfluous and can replace ideology as a basis for fundamental government decisions.

Before we abdicate control of the government to these new "professionals," we should ask whether their methods don't impose biases of their own. We should also ask whether years of graduate training in abstract "public policy"—surrounded by fellow future practitioners, cut off from other varieties of experience and fields of knowledge, and encouraged to avoid subjective judgments—really is the best preparation for a life of public service in a democracy.

Public policy academics, at the Kennedy School and elsewhere, are anxious to establish that "public policy" is something that can be taught in the abstract, and eager to demonstrate that what they teach is a real academic discipline. Therefore they prefer the precision of mathematics to the turmoil of intuition. In different ways, two Kennedy School texts are good examples of this preference.

The Essence of Decision, a book by Kennedy School dean Graham Allison that is regularly assigned at public policy schools across the country, is a history of the Cuban missile crisis. The book's historical chapters, on the missile crisis and American officials' attempts to interpret and handle it, are informative and interesting—and they stick closely to specifics, like an ordinary history book.

But every other chapter is theoretical—Allison's contribution to the new discipline of public policy. Here, intuitive, admittedly useful insights masquerade as complicated scientific laws. There's little understanding of diplomacy in these chapters that is not implicit in the 20 pages on "Political Morality" in Henry Adams's 70-year-old *Education*—which, besides being shorter, is easier to understand and much more fun to read. Allison's book proceeds by turns through what he calls Models I, II and III. This sounds more scientific than most writing about politics. But all it turns out to mean is that a government can be thought of as a group of bureaucratic institutions or as a group of leaders with conflicting ideas, and not only as a single rational actor. If Allison wants to say that large organizations are hard to change, he says: "The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t is t-1; the best explanation of what will happen at t+1 is t."

The Essence of Decision, first published in 1971, is an early example of public policy scholarship. The recent trend is to emphasize microeconomics, the social science that has come closest to achieving the mathematical precision of the "hard" sciences. Kennedy School students take two heavily microeconomic courses in the first year of the school's two-year policy program. Microeconomics studies individual economic units—the prices and wages associated with different goods and jobs, why and how much a factory pollutes the environment, how much benefit a government subsidy or regulation might provide.

Unlike calling tomorrow "t+1," microeconomics involves real mathematics, and it can give better answers to some administrative problems than even brilliant intuition would be likely to achieve. Public affairs schools apply microeconomic techniques to questions more general economics programs might not be interested in. For example, students work not only at price theory but also at queuing theory, which predicts how much an additional service unit—for instance one more tollbooth on a bridge or one more reception counter in a hospital—reduces waiting time for service. If you are designing bridges or attempting to administer a hospital, as some government officials do, this kind of analysis is useful. *A Primer for Policy Analysis* is an admirably lucid introduction to subjects like queuing theory, by Richard Zeckhauser, a Kennedy School professor, and Edith Stokey. It's a good example of how the kind of scientific expertise *The Essence of Decision* only pretends to can actually be worthwhile. But *A Primer for Policy Analysis* also shows the limitations of even real public policy expertise.

The primer, a basic text of the Kennedy School's "analytical methods" course, acknowledges that most policy choices involve not only flow charts but also "demands of several competing groups." In the end, Zeckhauser and Stokey concede, "the unhappy decision maker" may have to choose among opposing interests, "however painful the task." But implicit in the book's tone is a wish that such unpleasant choices—"political realities," as the book refers to them disparagingly—would go away. Then there could be right answers to policy questions, as there are right answers to questions in the physical sciences.

The trouble is that government isn't a science. At their best, mathematical models and microeconomic theory can accurately predict the consequences of different choices, so that people understand what they are getting themselves into. In practice, of course, even this is often difficult. As a result, factors that can be easily quantified tend to be treated with more respect than factors that can't. For example, should the government subsidize a dying industry to prevent unemployment? A simple microeconomic model would say no, this is irrational. A fancier model could take into account the "information" and "transaction" costs of finding a new job, the "psychic" cost of joblessness, etc., and might conclude a subsidy is worthwhile after all. But these sorts of things are almost impossible to quantify, and in applying these models they tend to get mentioned and then assumed away.

More important, this kind of analysis ignores the moral basis on which policy decisions must be made. Microeconomic theory has nothing to say about the basic distribution of wealth in the economy. Economists happily concede this limitation, as does *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. But in applying microeconomic

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analysis to concrete public policy decisions, there is a natural tendency to accept the current distribution of wealth as the correct one, since to suppose otherwise will only render the fancy analytical tools worthless. Lawrence Lynn, chairman of the Kennedy School's public policy program, says that each year the school gets better at discussing "political realities" and fighting whatever dangers are inherent in a heavily microeconomic approach to public policy.

Senator Edward Kennedy, the nation's leading advocate of national health insurance, serves on the advisory committee of the school named for his brother John, and takes some interest in its workings. But of course there is no Kennedy School "line" on national health insurance, any more than on other controversial topics. But there's a Kennedy School "style" that tends to focus debate about the question on problems of costs and benefits and efficiency. Even though giving people free health care may be "inefficient," encouraging excessive demand, economists recognize that there are factors on the other side—from reducing lost work time to arguments that health care simply ought to be a right. But even though it acknowledges this possibility, economic theory's thrust is hostile to factors like this last one. They're put aside during debates on costs and benefits—it's hard to put a monetary tag on them, so they're assumed away.

Policy academics often defend themselves against such criticism by pointing out that even goals like equality and fairness can be achieved in more or less "efficient" ways. Instead of creating a health service in which willingness to wait replaces willingness to pay (of course, this is not the only kind of health service imaginable), why not redistribute income directly, and then let a more equitable market system take its natural direction? Zeckhauser and Stokey end their chapter on queuing theory with the thought that making people wait for things—though it admittedly allocates scarce resources in a way not obviously favoring the rich—is "an exceedingly inefficient way for redistributing income." This is true. But citizens might be willing to tolerate the distribution of income in general, but might not want it to affect the availability of health care. Such desires often lack an articulated basis—certainly an articulated basis of the kind professional schools can teach. But they lie at the heart of lots of democratic debate and action. A planner's real choice generally isn't inefficient rationing or an efficient, radical program for redistributing all wealth, but rationing or leaving things the way they are.

Like all good social science, Kennedy School economics starts by acknowledging its limits and assumptions. But it's sometimes easy to forget these while discussion of a political idea is going on. Professional administration presents as technical, beyond the competence of ordinary people, problems that are basically political—conflicts of values where microeconomics can't provide a "right" answer.

Students enter the Kennedy School with varied interests and backgrounds, about half directly from college, about half after some time in government or other jobs. What they share is a somewhat vague interest in public service. Like law schools, schools of public affairs attract many students who have no clear idea why they're there. Sometimes it's just an aversion, for one reason or another, to other kinds of graduate training and a felt need for more education. To the extent that the government is now dominated by lawyers and executives from private firms, bringing public policy graduates into government may broaden its diversity and scope. But graduates of prestigious administration schools hardly constitute an upsurge from the grass roots of the country, or from interests and groups previously under-represented in our government. They're more like other professionals in government than they are like the broader public they're supposed to serve and represent. Planning professionals may be less committed to business interests than planners from the business and corporate law worlds, but creating a whole new profession with interests of its own—in a world that's more than mystified enough by the professions that exist already—hardly seems like an "efficient" way to bring about a mild increase in public servants' performance.

The Energy Department is the first federal cabinet department made to order by and for public policy professionals. It resembles the New Deal Agriculture Department as the government's key center of innovative economic planning. It is said to have the largest concentration of Kennedy School graduates in government, something like a dozen in the department's "policy planning" office alone.

It's probably a coincidence that the Energy Department has a reputation as the worst managed in the government. Bad luck has plagued Department planners—most recently, the *Wall Street Journal* reported, when Iran's revolution created an oil shortage. The Department has 80 million barrels of crude oil, stored in empty Gulf Goast salt caverns. But because planners decided current funds should be spent on buying oil instead of installing pumps, the emergency reserve is useless. Department officials defend this decision as a calculated gamble that turned out badly. "None of our planning scenarios called for an oil shortage before 1980," the reserve's director said.

The Department's deference to professional planners did not prevent what *Business Week* recently described as "low morale and a management structure that is slowing progress on some of the agency's most critical programs." It also helps to explain the Department's extreme tendency to hire outside policy consultants at every turn. As the *New Republic* reported last year ("The Energy Hustle," *TNR*, March 11, 1978), a computer printout of outside Department contracts goes on for almost 1000 pages. One contract was to

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"develop a program to implement a plan for the federal energy management program multi-year action plan."

Blinkered professionals haven't yet managed to sweep politics completely out of government. And no one denies some of the skills professional administration schools are teaching can be useful. But even the Kennedy School catalogue is evidence that people had higher ideals than these in mind when they set policy schools up. The catalogue indiscriminately lists attributes besides a public policy degree that might be useful in government service: "common sense, compassion, a legal education, strong motivation, or a consideration of ethical dimensions inherent in policy choice." Shelley Metzenbaum, a Kennedy School student, says her education was fine "for people with strong political views—I don't mean Democratic or Republican or democratic socialist, but knowing whom you cared about before you started." And maybe this is all an administration school can do—provide some skills that people then can use for whatever causes they brought with them when they started school.

The danger is that this new mandarin class will become its own cause as special public policy training becomes more widely sought after and respected in a government that is still supposed to serve all kinds of people—workers, poor people, uneducated people, as well as professionals and others who are comfortably off. And these other people's untutored biases are assumed away throughout much of the special training public policy professionals receive. In their stead, professional administrators are developing a scientific-sounding theory with an only intermittently acknowledged bias—including self-justification—of its own. Spreading through Washington, like the uplifting homilies of businessmen's Bruce Barton 50 years ago, is the cool, collected but ultimately still political gospel according to *A Primer for Policy Analysis*:

> *Above all, practice presenting your conclusions systematically; you don't need to become a gifted and sophisticated analyst before you can upgrade your output. Make up your mind that at least once every day you will deliberately apply the outline set forth above to a problem you face. You'll be amazed at what it will do for your reputation for perceptiveness and good judgment.*

One place in Africa where immigrant domination goes unchallenged.

Settler State

by Kenneth Adelman

Monrovia

"The internal settlement is working out. Give it a chance," counseled a Western diplomat on the spot. The five percent or so of the population who make up the settler class still see themselves as the bringers of "civilization, Christianity and capitalism" (in Dr. Livingstone's felicitous phrase) in an otherwise dark land. They still run the show. A recent State Department report says, "The descendants of the settlers nonetheless remain in control of political and economic power, and the tribal peoples have yet to gain full equality." But the lot of the delicately labeled "tribal peoples" is improving as the rulers feel the winds of change sweeping across the African continent.

Rhodesia? No, Liberia—Africa's oldest republic and its only black settler state.

People normally hear of Liberia only when some dilapidated tanker registered there pollutes some magnificent beach. (Liberia is to ships what Delaware is to corporations—a legal haven from strict regulations elsewhere.) Few know about Liberia as a society where ex-slaves and their descendants are the elite and the never enslaved are the riffraff. Graham Greene's *Travel Without Maps* contains what is still the best description of this hilarious country; little has happened in Liberia's interior since 1936 to make the book outdated.

But now Liberia is bracing itself for the limelight. Thirty new chalets have been thrown up at $150,000 a throw (Liberia's per capita income is around $500 yearly) to house African heads of states for a few days during the Organization for African Unity summit meeting in July. Liberian President William R. Tolbert Jr. will then be knighted as OAU chairman.

The future rulers of Liberia began arriving in 1822 as

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liberated American slaves. Though few in number, totaling about 20,000, they were big on spirit—as determined to build a new life in a beautiful new land, and to control the country, as were the British arriving in Rhodesia. The settlers named their new capital Monrovia, after American president James Monroe. This was in gratitude not only for the American money that helped finance the colony, but also for Monroe's valuable advice about how to negotiate lopsided treaties with the tribal chiefs to the east, just as Monroe was negotiating with tribal chiefs in the American West.

The voyage of those stalwart freed men and women still looms large in the Liberian national consciousness. The national emblem portrays a dove of peace flying above a clipper ship and a bright, rising sun. Above is the national motto: "The Love of LIBERTY Brought Us Here." No matter that 95 percent of the people never set foot on a clipper ship, nor did their ancestors, and weren't "brought . . . here" by the love of anything. Liberia's red, white and blue flag is often mistaken for Old Glory, but has only one star in the corner instead of 50. Liberia's money is the greenback, though most are brown and limp from long circulation.

Liberian politics reflects the settlers' background even more than politics in Rhodesia. Liberia has a president, a vice-president who also heads up the Senate, a House of Representatives and a Supreme Court with associate justices and a chief justice. Much as General MacArthur wrote Japan's constitution by cutting and pasting from our basic documents, Liberia's constitution was drawn up by a Harvard professor. But Liberians grasp the absurdity of it. For one thing, they dropped Harvard; Cornell drew up Liberia's recent legal codes.

In practice, Liberians largely ignore all those nice American legalisms. Liberia's president rules with few restraints (though the country's human rights record is exemplary for Africa). There is only one political party, the True Whig party, which has broken all Western records with a century-long uninterrupted string of victories.

Liberia's constitution is more racist than Rhodesia's. It provides that only "persons of Negro descent" may become Liberian citizens, vote, or own land. This is not much of an issue, since both the settler class and the natives are black. But Liberia's rulers are often distinguishable by sight. Some are mulatto and all are ethnically distinct from Liberia's 28 indigenous groups. Ex-slaves trace their roots through the US back to the Congo basin; virtually no blacks were captured for slavery around the Liberian territory. Hence the settlers' "return home" was to the right continent but the wrong area.

Liberia's early colonizers faced the same hostile reception as the white colonizers who created Rhodesia. As a result, the freed formerly oppressed began oppressing the formerly free.

Tribal rebellions flared late in the 19th century. A

major one shriveled when a US warship appeared off Monrovia's shore, back when such demonstrations evoked more than horselaughs. The rulers then set up the "Liberian Frontier Force." Much in the grisly manner of Rhodesia's Seleous Scouts, they burned, looted and raped in villages when a speck of trouble arose, and often when it didn't. A colonial apparatus was also fashioned. Liberian officials set aside three provinces—Rhodesia called them tribal trust lands—with two layers of settler-administrators overseeing a network of docile tribal chiefs. The twin colonial goals were stopping rebellions and collecting taxes. Most rebellions, of course, were sparked by the collection of taxes. The natives were upset that their money seemed to go only for tax-collectors and rebellion-squashers, not for any helpful services in the bush. There was no social mixing. The Masons, as influential in Liberia as the mysterious *broederbond* fraternity in South Africa, excluded anyone who was not of settler stock. As in Rhodesia, only foreign missionaries furnished educational and social facilities—such as they were—for the peasants.

In the early 1920s, the League of Nations investigated charges that the president and vice-president of Liberia, both of thoroughbred ex-slave stock, were ringmasters of a squalid slave trade on Fernando Pao (now part of Equatorial Guinea, which British groups recently accused of still permitting slavery). The League team ventured far beyond its mandate. It condemned the place lock, stock and barrel and recommended (in a distinctly unlibertarian manner) that Liberia be deprived of liberty and turned into a conventional, white-dominated colony. Sensing

(continued on page 39, following advertising insert)

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A report from The Edison Electric Institute

SYMPOSIUM

A Special 16-Page Overview

The electric car: will there be one in your garage?

The USA charges up.

Safety factors.

A gallery of current EVs.

Plus ecological and technological test results.



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The electric car: 100 years in the making.

The first road vehicles that traveled by themselves were introduced in the latter part of the 18th century. They were steam-powered, difficult to start and even more difficult to operate. Still, by the mid-1800s, more than 100 American companies were producing steam cars. At the same time, a number of inventors in both Europe and America were exploring a more promising power source: electricity. Frenchman Gaston Plante's development of the storage battery in 1859-'60 made the electric car feasible, and in 1890 William Morrison introduced the first American battery-powered automobile, which was capable of a speed of 14 mph. By the turn of the century, 38 per cent of American cars were powered by electricity. By 1912, the peak year of acceptance, some 30,000 electric cars manufactured by 20 companies were on the road—all of them with an inherent limitation that has persisted to the present: the EVs' restricted range due to the need to recharge the battery.

In search of a better propulsion system, inventors soon turned to the internal combustion engine. In the ensuing years, ICE vehicles overshadowed EVs. Nonetheless, EVs continued to evolve throughout the gas-powered auto era, the electric golf cart and fork lift truck being notable examples of mass application of electric propulsion.

The energy crisis has spurred new EV efforts by both governmental and private groups throughout the world. In 1973, the Electric Vehicle Council, New York, and the International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy, Paris, began sponsoring an annual International Electric Vehicle Symposium to review the state of progress of electric vehicle technology and to exchange experience and information on the different factors that influence its development.



The following articles are drawn from papers presented at the Fifth International Electric Vehicle Symposium held in Philadelphia in October, 1978, and represent solely the views of the distinguished international participants. The Edison Electric Institute is making the material available in this form because it is dedicated to offering concerned citizens impartial information on the various issues and technological developments affecting the nation's electricity needs, usage and delivery systems.

Readers interested in obtaining further information on any aspect of electric vehicle development are invited to write or call The Edison Electric Institute, 90 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016, (212) 573-8700. After June 1979, EEI will be in new consolidated offices at 1111 19th Street, Washington, DC 20036●



Symposium is edited by Rees Behrendt and designed by George Kurten.

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Uncle Sam in the driver's seat.

THE UNITED STATES ELECTRIC AND HYBRID VEHICLE PROGRAM IS UNDER WAY. HERE'S WHERE IT STANDS TODAY.

by P.J. Brown, Department of Energy, USA

In September 1976, the United States Congress enacted Public Law 94-413, The Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1976. Congress states in the act that it is clear that the nation's dependence on foreign sources of petroleum must be reduced. Since transportation is the single largest use of petroleum supplies, the introduction of significant numbers of electric and hybrid vehicles into the transportation fleet would reduce the use and dependence on petroleum.

To implement the provisions of the act, the Department of Energy has established an Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Program that has three main thrusts. First, to foster and support research development testing and evaluation of electric and hybrid vehicles systems and their component technology to improve the performance of vehicles on the road. Second, to assess the economic and technical practicability of electric vehicles by undertaking a broadly based, federally supported vehicle demonstration. Finally, to enhance the infant electric and hybrid industry by assisting in financing the commercial production of competitive vehicles.

Congress demonstrated its continued interest in the EHV program with the enactment of Public Law 95-238, The Department of Energy Act of 1978—Civilian Applications. In the provisions of Title VI of this Act, amendments to the original Public Law 94-413 were incorporated to improve the overall program. One of the major amendments concerns the schedule for the acquisition of demonstration vehicles and also increasing the total number of demonstration vehicles from 7,500 to 10,000. It was felt by members of Congress and the DOE that the premature demonstration of current technology would not permit proper response to market and technology developments. The law was therefore amended to allow flexibility in the timing and in the quantities to be procured.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION

In order to advance the technology of electric and hybrid vehicles, the Department of Energy is conducting an intensive research development, testing and evaluation program. (A summary of DOE's state-of-the-art assessment accompanies this article.)

Two different near-term electric vehicle designs are being developed, and integrated test vehicles are being fabricated by the General Electric Company and the Garrett Corporation. These vehicles are scheduled for completion and to be ready for test by May 1979. Some of the performance objectives of the two designs are displayed in Table I for the near-term electric vehicle.

The DOE is also conducting a program for the development of near-term hybrid vehicles. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory has been selected by DOE to procure and manage the contracts for the hybrid vehicle program.

In addition to total vehicle design developments, a major effort in battery development for electric and hybrid vehicles is being carried out. Three battery systems have been identified as candidates for R&D effort leading to improvement in the near term: (1) nickel/iron (2) nickel/zinc and (3) lead/acid.

The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is the program manager for DOE, and eight subcontractors have been selected for the development efforts: lead/acid—Globe Union, ESB and Eltra; nickel/zinc—Yardney, ERC and Gould; nickel/iron—Westinghouse and Eagle Picher. These American battery companies are also working with a number of foreign battery companies. Each contract culminates with the delivery in 1980 and 1981 of up to 15 full size EV batteries from pilot development lines. A National Battery Test Laboratory is operational at ANL to evaluate, verify and make test comparisons of cells, modules and

TABLE I - NEAR TERM ELECTRIC VEHICLE OBJECTIVES

Min. Passenger Capacity	4 Adults
Max. Curb Weight	Open
Min. Urban Range-Kilometers (miles)	121 (75)
Max. Initial Cost (1975 dollars)	$ 6,000
Min. Life-Kilometers (miles)	161,000 (100,000)
Max. Life Cycle Cost - ¢/km (¢/mile)	6.00 (9.5)
Max. Electric Recharge Energy in Urban Driving - KWh/km (KWh/mile)	0.32 (0.5)
Max. Recharge Time - Hours	8
Safety Features	Meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Min. Unserviced Park Duration - Days	7
Min. Ambient Temperature Range - °C (°F)	-29 to + 52 (-20 to +125)
Min. Top Speed - km/hr (mi/hr)	97 (60)
Min. Acceleration - Seconds for 0-48 km/hr (0-30 mph)	9
Min. Merging Time - Seconds for 40-89 km/hr (25-55 mph)	18

Some significant breakthroughs have occurred in these projects, such as the lightweight flywheel design by Garrett and the transistor modules by General Electric.

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batteries under uniformly applied test conditions.

For the DOE program, NASA's Lewis Research Centers are negotiating contracts covering improved and advanced EHV propulsion systen component technology. These improved technology contracts cover: (1) a.c. motor controllers, (2) mechanically commutated d.c. motors, (3) electronically commutated d.c. motors and (4) energy buffer for regenerative braking. Advanced d.c. motor controllers and electric motor development contracts are also being negotiated.

DEMONSTRATIONS

In compliance with Public Law 94-413, the DOE issued performance standards on May 30, 1978, for the first demonstration vehicle acquisition. A summary of the standards for personal use and commercial vehicles is given in Table II.

public utilities or delivery services, or marketing and service operators, who will sell or lease to individuals or small companies. In addition to the private sector site operators, federal, state and local government fleets will participate in the demonstration program. Over 50 cities have indicated an interest in the program.

After the demonstration operators have purchased their vehicles from the manufacturers, the operational phase of the project will begin, and data will be kept on the functioning of the vehicles.

INCENTIVES

Congress incorporated provisions for incentives (such as Loan Guaranties) in Public Law 94-413 to encourage private sector involvement in the program. Under its provisions, private loans up to $3 million per project may be guaranteed by the federal government. A ceiling of $60 million has been set

TABLE II SUMMARY–PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ELECTRIC AND HYBRID VEHICLES

Parameter	Conditions	Personal Use (Note 1)	Commercial (Note 1)
Acceleration	0-50 km/h	15 sec.	15 sec.
Gradeability	@ 25 km/k	10%	10%
Gradeability Limit	for 20 sec.	20%	20%
Forward Speed	for 5 min.	80 km/h	70 km/h
Range (SAE 227a)	EV	50 km–C cycle	50 km–B cycle
	HV	200 km–C cycle	200 kkm–B cycle
Energy Consumption	EV	*	*
	Hv (Note 2)	1.3 MJ/km (non-elec)	9.8 kj/km.kg (non-elec)
Battery Recharge Time	from 80% discharge (110 or 220 vac)	10 hours	
Safety		NHTSA Stds. * + others	
Emissions		FED. Stds.	
Recharge Control		YES	
State-of-Charge Meter		YES	
Odometer		YES	
Heater		Available as Option	
Documentation		YES	

Notes: 1) SAE 1227a Test Procedures apply
2) Non-Electrical Consumption must be 75% of total energy consumed
3) Refer to official publication of standards

To implement the EHV Demonstration Project, the Department of Energy will utilize local demonstration site operators who will provide the requisite maintenance and parts supply support as well as furnishing operator or market demonstration vehicles.

The private sector groups will be either fleet operators, such as

for the aggregate amount of guaranties outstanding at any one time. Public Law 95-238 also amended the Loan Guaranties section of the original act by establishing an Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Development Fund in the Treasury of the United States.

Another incentive for small business is the availability of planning grants for firms who lack the funds necessary to prepare and submit proposals.

In addition to the financial incentives, Congress authorized the conduct of studies and research programs on incentives that will encourage greater use of electric and hybrid vehicles. A number of studies have been initiated identifying barriers to the use of EHVs and suggesting corrective incentives.

STUDIES

Section 13 of Public Law 94-413 states that four specific areas are to be studied:

(1) *Institutional Factors* that may bias the transportation system towards vehicles of particular characteristics. A study was conducted by the Transportation Systems Center of the U.S. Department of Transportation, in August, 1977. A continuing effort is being made by TSC to suggest alternative ways of overcoming the barriers of EHV.

(2) *Long-Range Material Demands and Pollution Effects* stemming from the use of electric and hybrid vehicles. This study was completed by General Research Corporation on August 11, 1977.

(3) *Safety Standards and Regulations* for electric and hybrid vehicles are recommended to DOE by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

(4) *Regenerative Braking* system effectiveness and feasibility for electric automobiles. This study is being conducted for DOE by The Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

In addition, DOE is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to determine the agricultural uses of electric vehicles.

The ultimate goal of the federal program is to assist in the commercialization of a viable and competitive electric vehicle industry. With an industry capable of producing electric and hybrid vehicles for personal use and commercial vans at competitive life cycle costs, it is possible that as many as 10 million electric and hybrid vehicles will be part of the transportation fleet in the year 2000. This will result in an annual saving of 100 million barrels of oil a year●

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State-of-the-Art Assessment Update

W.J. *Dippold, of the Department of Energy, summarizes the results of 1978 electric vehicle state-of-the-art assessment reports:*

It is clear from the data of the various reports that vehicles with current technology in batteries, controllers and motors provide more energy efficiency with four-speed manual transmissions than vehicles without transmissions or those using automatic transmissions. The data show this to be true of both personal and commercial vehicles.

Because of the large variation in motor characteristics, particularly torque, it is difficult to assess the value of a transmission on time to accelerate to moderate speeds. The analysis is equally difficult on gradeability at low speeds above 5 kilometers per hour. The original SOAA report shows that the gradeability limit at two to three kilometers per hour of a current SOA vehicle is measurably improved by a four-speed manual transmission. Without a transmission, it is clearly observable during testing that the battery current demand on starting is much higher. This is particularly true of vehicles that are geared to have top speeds greater than 70 kilometers per hour and that are not equipped with a maximum current limit controller. The data show the gradeability of vehicles with four-speed transmissions to be better than the gradeability of vehicles without transmissions at vehicle speeds of 50 kilometers per hour and greater.

While these few vehicles provide insufficient data to draw firm conclusions either presently or long-term, the data do indicate that there are some distinct advantages to a four-speed transmission in current technology electric vehicles. The effects on energy efficiency (range improvement), reduction of power demands on the battery at start-up and improvements in gradeability at moving traffic speeds would appear to offset the inconvenience of having to shift while driving. Opportunities are clearly visible for improvements in controller-motor designs to limit the power demands on the battery for routine start-up of a vehicle without a transmission and to improve the torque characteristics (i.e., gradeability) at the higher speed end. Alternatively, transmission design opportunities continue to be visible with the objective of maintaining the apparent advantages of the four-speed transmission but requiring no overt action on the part of the driver to change gears●

From the paper: Electric Vehicle State-of-the-Art Assessment Update.



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The smog fighters are coming.

AN L.A. STUDY SHOWS EVS WOULD SHARPLY REDUCE TODAY'S ICE AIR POLLUTION.

—by D.L. Harbaugh, Southern California Edison Co., USA

The air pollution of an electric vehicle can be compared to that of a gasoline vehicle in two ways:

(1) total pollutants emitted into the atmosphere due to operation of each type vehicle on a per mile basis; and

(2) the effect of these emissions in terms of ground level concentration.

The emitted pollutants include not only those from the vehicle but also emission from the power plant (to generate the electricity required to charge the EV battery) and the oil refinery (for manufacture of both the gasoline and power plant fuel oil). The emissions for the electric vehicle are calculated based on an oil-fired generating plant because:

(1) these plants generate the majority of Southern California Edison power in the Los Angeles area; and

(2) it simplifies the problem of power and pollutants mix analysis (i.e., from hydro, nuclear, etc.).

The time frame used for this analysis was 1980 because:

(1) it is sufficiently near-term to use current SCE data; and

(2) a number of the references from which data have been extracted have used 1980 as the study year.

SCE agrees with the original ERDA estimate for EV energy consumption of 0.8 kwhrs/mile, and this estimate has been used to calculate the total pollutants per mile in the pollution table. This table is a "worst case" example, and it still indicates that, except for SO2, the electric vehicle will be clearly superior to the gasoline vehicle in terms of emitted pollutants.

In addition, the following factors should also be considered in the comparison:

(1) To the extent that further emission reductions are required and can be made practicable at generating stations, it will further reduce emission levels. While installation and maintenance of control systems at refineries and power plants require a substantial investment, this may ultimately be a more practical solution than the installation and maintenance of millions of miniaturized control systems on the automobile population or disruptive traffic control measures.

(2) In practice, the effectiveness of existing automobile pollution control systems has been shown to deteriorate because of age and inadequate maintenance. In contrast, power plant emission controls are continuously maintained.

(3) Most importantly, because the pollutants are removed from the sites of concentrated local pollution (i.e., downtown freeways) and are instead expelled from high smokestacks, the contribution to the breathable ground level pollution is sharply reduced, in most cases by over 99 per cent.

Further, in populated areas that are located directly adjacent to power plant exhaust stacks, pollutant levels within the ground plane of the emission plume should contribute but a small fraction of the concentations that define air quality standards to protect health and welfare, even under adverse conditions.

The end effect of electric vehicle use in the Los Angeles Basin will be to reduce the air pollution caused by automobile travel, because:

(1) Electric vehicles introduce significantly less total and individual pollutants on a per mile basis than gasoline-powered vehicles (except for SO2 emissions, which are only slightly greater on a per mile basis in the worst-case analysis). It should also significantly reduce formation of oxidant, a secondary pollutant.

(2) To the extent that power plant emission reductions are required, and can practicably be made, the comparison is even more favorable for the EV.

(3) To the extent that battery-charging energy is supplied by nuclear hydroelectric and out-of-state coal-fired plants, the comparison is also more favorable for EVs.

(4) Electric vehicles will reduce the automobile contribution to ground-level pollutant concentrations by over 90 per cent, because the EV emission source will be from elevated power plant exhaust stacks.

(5) Shifting the automobile emissions point from the individual tail pipe to a power plant stack offers continual, superior opportunities for control of automotive air pollution emissions●

TOTAL POLLUTION CONTRIBUTION

Electric Veh.	HC	CO	NO2	SO2	Part.
Vehicle	0	0	0	0	0
Power Plant (a)	.128	.024	.696	.752	.080
Refinery (b)	.007	.002	.061	.198	.010
Total (c)	.135	.026	.757	.950	.090
Gasoline Veh.					
Vehicle	4.1(e)	9.00(a)	1.50(d)	0.13(f)	0.12(g)
Power Plant	0	0	0	0	0
Refinery (e)	.99	.001	.040	.071	.010
Total (c)	5.09	9.01	1.54	.84	.130

From the paper: A Comparison of the Overall Air Pollution Contributions of Electric and Gasoline-Powered Vehicles in the Los Angeles Area.

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Making the electric car safe.

CONVENTIONAL CARS HAVE HAD 80 YEARS TO OVERCOME THEIR HAZARDS. TO COMPETE, EVS MUST ENGINEER IN SAFETY FROM THE START.

—by G. G. Harding, Lucas Batteries Ltd., United Kingdom

As the development of battery electric vehicles with good road performance leads to greater numbers of such vehicles being operated alongside their conventional counterparts, unless EVs are seen to be at least as safe as ordinary cars, their further adoption could be impeded by the attitudes of potential operators and/or legislators.

Because battery-powered vehicles with high performance have only been introduced within the last decade, equal safety standards will need to be achieved in a very short time in comparison with conventional vehicles, which have had 80 years to achieve present levels of safety. To this end, members of the Lucas electric vehicle development team and others associated with them have given serious attention to safety aspects of EV designs.

The Lucas electric vehicle program has now run for over 10 years, and during this time the 65 vehicles that have been built have accumulated over a quarter of a million miles under operational conditions, using lightweight lead-acid batteries. Throughout this development period, it proved very difficult indeed to forecast some of the safety problems, even those that, subsequent to their discovery, appear to have been impossible to overlook. An example of this was the first battery explosion in a Lucas vehicle. The effect of explosions in single cells is well known and produces little damage, but an explosion due to ignition of an explosive gas mixture that has accumulated in the space above the battery as well as in the cells is a very different phenomenon. This occurred during a Sunday night in the very hot summer of 1976 due to an overcharging situation in a garage which had not been approved by Lucas.

The explosion very nearly demolished the vehicle. As a safeguard against another similar incident, all Lucas vehicles were withdrawn from service, and a thorough investigation was begun to determine the factors leading to various situations where explosions can occur and all possible means of averting such conditions.



We examined such factors as the speed of gas dispersion under various conditions and the rate at which gas is generated when regenerative braking is used with a battery near the fully charged state. Tests clearly pointed to the need for very thorough ventilation of the battery compartment. It was therefore necessary to build a charger and associated venting system to meet strict requirements in addition to the current/time schedule for charging in the minimum time with minimum overcharge.

In order to prevent a propagated explosion, as opposed to single cell explosions, the gaseous mixture in the battery compartment must be kept below the lower explosive limit (L.E.L.) under all operating conditions. The L.E.L. for hydrogen in air is 4% by volume, but it is understood that, once initiated, an explosion can be propagated at levels considerably below this, and Lucas is aiming for a hydrogen level within the battery compartment of one-quarter of the L.E.L. to prevent propagation from one cell to another. To ensure that this limit is not exceeded the system must be designed so that the charger limits the gassing current to a pre-set level, and the battery compartment is adequately ventilated.

Natural ventilation of the battery compartment of the latest Lucas vehicles in service has been maximized by leaving the battery compartment open around the top. The interconnections between individual battery units are sealed to protect them from the effects of moisture and dirt. However, with the battery suspended only a very short distance below the vehicle floor, it has been found that such a system still requires some forced ventilation over the tops of the batteries during charging, and this is achieved by tangential a.c. mains fans.

An explosion can only occur, of course, if there is both an explosive mixture and a suitable ignition source, which may be as small as a low voltage spark. It is therefore essential that the positioning of contactors, d.c. motors or any other spark-producing equipment in or near the battery compartment should be avoided.

HANDLING BATTERY PACKS

In our present van models, the battery is contained in a pannier, which is positioned under the floor of the vehicle. In addition to facilitating the removal and replacement of the battery, by lowering and raising it vertically, such an arrangement has the advan-

From the paper: Some Aspects of Electric Vehicle Safety.

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tage that the body of the vehicle can be completely sealed from the battery compartment.

The battery pannier, in addition to supporting the weight of the battery, must also protect it from road debris which may be thrown up by the wheels. In addition, an air space is provided around the battery units to avoid overheating during prolonged heavy charge or discharge periods. The use of stainless steel (AISI Type 316) provides the required strength and impact resistance to withstand road usage and also overcomes corrosion problems associated with accidental acid spillage. Panniers made from GRP, using fire retardant resins and metal reinforcement as necessary, and from other plastics, are being investigated, since they offer the additional built-in safety feature of electrical insulation.

SAFE WORKING WITH HIGH VOLTAGE

High performance electric vehicles, by definition, require motors, controllers and batteries that can deliver relatively high levels of power. Mainly for reasons of cost, it is necessary to keep currents as low as possible, and therefore higher system voltages are likely to be required than have generally been used hitherto on battery vehicles. The present Lucas 1-ton payload delivery vehicles use 50 hp (37 kW) traction motors with a nominal system voltage of 216 V. This comparatively high d.c. voltage clearly needs to be treated with respect, and thorough precautions need to be taken to protect personnel from electric shock, whether they are using the vehicle, servicing it or attending to the batteries.

In order to minimize the danger of electric shocks on the vehicle itself, and at the same time reduce the chances of accidental short circuits through insulation failure, the high voltage power system is designed to be totally isolated electrically from the vehicle body, so that accidental contact with a "live" potential will not complete a circuit to earth.

The main battery connections are linked to the controller via double pole isolating contactors, which are normally in the open position except when the controller is switched on.

The ability to remove the battery complete in its pannier also enables the high voltage connections to the vehicle to be broken automatically by means of a plug and socket without the need for any manual removal of connecting leads within the vehicle.

ELECTRONIC CONTROL SYSTEMS

In an electric vehicle incorporating a thyristor as its main current control element, the motor power is controlled by rapid switching of the motor current by a solid state device. This provides very smooth control of the traction motor and also enables the full performance of the vehicle to be maintained until the battery is almost fully discharged.

In the event of a malfunction, however, the current switch can remain in the "on" position, so that the driver loses control of the motor current. With a series motor, by its very nature this means a high fault torque or motor power, until interrupted by the system fuse. Normally this takes place almost instantaneously, and there is no danger to the vehicle occupants or bystanders, but in certain circumstances the fuse may take some time to blow, resulting in a temporary effect somewhat similar to a throttle sticking on an ICE vehicle. All our latest vehicles are fitted with a cut-out button, designed to enable a driver to isolate the battery from the drive system in an emergency.

FUSES AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS

Fuses are essentially non-ideal circuit elements, taking a finite time to blow, depending on the degree of overload. In a series system, at high vehicle speeds, the fault current is limited by the series motor characteristic, and blowing times can be relatively long. The rating of fuse necessary to protect the vehicle against the consequences of control failure may be lower than that which would otherwise be chosen for the application, leading to a somewhat reduced life. It has also been established that even if a fuse is operated within its rating, the combination of vibration and thermal cycling experienced in the normal duty cycle of a vehicle will eventually cause the failure of a present generation semiconductor fuse through mechanical fatigue of the fuse elements. Because of these shortcomings, we are investigating the possiblity of using a magnetic circuit breaker as the primary circuit protection element.

REGENERATIVE BRAKING

Regenerative braking is fitted to Lucas vehicles for three main reasons: first, to reduce wear of the normal friction braking system, thereby reducing down time and maintenance costs; second, to reduce the extent to which a vehicle's battery is discharged by any given duty cycle, since this may increase battery life; and third, to improve the feel or "driveability" of the vehicle.

The design of the regenerative braking system is such that the first element of regenerative braking comes into operation when the accelerator pedal is released. This roughly equates to "engine braking" in an ICE vehicle. The first movement of the brake pedal brings into operation a higher level of regenerative braking, which at its maximum gives rise to a retardation of the order of 20%g. On the latest vehicles, provided the brake pedal remains depressed, regenerative braking remains in operation until the vehicle is virtually at rest.

From time to time it has been suggested that relatively high levels of regenerative braking can only be applied with safety to front-wheel-drive vehicles, and that on ice-covered roads regenerative braking of the level used on Lucas vehicles applied to the rear wheels only might induce dangerous wheel skids. International braking regulations also specify that the service braking action should be on all wheels and that an increasing pedal movement should be accompanied by an increase in vehicle retardation, and vice versa. The particular features of regenerative braking may not be entirely compatible with these regulatory requirements and may necessitate further discussion.

Lucas has conducted a number of tests in an endeavor to establish whether rear wheel skids

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can be induced under adverse conditions by regenerative braking. Although it is not claimed that such testing has been exhaustive, so far it has not been possible to induce rear wheel skids by this means.

PARKING BRAKES

Unlike ICE vehicles, electric vehicles of the type not fitted with an automatic gearbox have no means other than the parking brake for locking the wheels when parked. In hilly terrains, some operators of Lucas vehicles have requested an additional means of locking the wheels. This is because parking brake ratchets are known to fail from time to time. It is desirable to be able to meet this requirement, and we are currently working on alternative solutions.

WATER WADE TESTS

Lucas does not intend ever to be a company that manufactures vehicles. In order to ensure that the complete vehicle into which the Lucas drive system is fitted is completely satisfactory, it is necessary for it to be developed and tested by its manufacturer. Lucas considers itself very fortunate to be working closely with GM's UK subsidiary, Vauxhall Motors, and sharing a joint development program with them. In addition to performance and handling, the program has included shallow water wade tests, which initially showed that water entered the control system housing, the motor, the main battery connection and the battery compartment itself. Gradually these problems have been overcome, and it is now possible to drive vehicles at 25 mph (40kph) in water 4 inches (100mm) deep without problems even under these very severe conditions.

SILENCE

One of the attributes of electric vehicles frequently alleged by many people to be both an environmental advantage and at the same time also a hazard is their relative silence. It is often suggested that, being silent, they must present additional danger to pedestrians, particularly to old people.

So far we have not experienced this problem in service and believe that this may be partly due to the fact that in cities most vehicles are preceded by a vehicle and also followed by another. It is almost impossible to stand on the sidewalk and pick out which of the three fairly closely spaced vehicles is the quiet electric. The relative silence of the many thousands of electric milk delivery vehicles operating in the UK is not known to have caused any significant safety problems.

HEATING

It is now almost universally accepted that the most appropriate means of heating an electric vehicle is by one of the several types of proprietary combustion heaters currently available. These are manufactured as either air-or-water-heaters, and alternative types will operate on gasoline, kerosene or bottled gas. Kerosene for heating is safer under crash conditions than gasoline, and to add to the safety, the fuel tank is filled with aluminum mesh and is positioned in a relatively safe situation behind the front axle beam.

DRIVER CONTROLS

A feature included on every Lucas vehicle has been the automatic selection of a "no-drive" situation if the equivalent of the ignition key is turned to the "off" position. This is to ensure that when the driver switches on again movement of the accelerator pedal will not cause the vehicle to move at all, let alone in an unexpected direction. In order to move the vehicle at all after turning the key, the driver must make a positive selection of the direction in which he wishes to move before the accelerator becomes operative. In addition, Lucas vehicles incorporate a speed limiting device whenever reverse is selected, but the device does not limit the torque available.

Lucas believes that there should be free exchange of information on all aspects of safety among companies involved in electric vehicle development, to ensure that these vehicles become as safe as possible as soon as possible●

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The shape of the future.

THREE PLUG-IN PROTOTYPES FROM SOME 100 SHOWN AT THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC VEHICLE SYMPOSIUM.

The Centennial Electric

General Electric Research and Development Center
P.O. Box 8, Schenectady, N.Y. 12301

Named in honor of General Electric's 100th birthday, this four-passenger, front-wheel drive subcompact was designed to achieve top performance from off-the-shelf components and commercially available battery systems. It was built to GE specifications by Triad Services, Inc., of Dearborn, Michigan, and is powered by 18 six-volt, lead-acid batteries from Globe-Union, Inc.

The vehicle has a range of 75 miles at a constant 40 miles per hour, a cruising speed of 55 mph and a passing speed of up to 60 mph. In stop-and-go urban driving, its range is about 45 miles between charges. It can accelerate from zero to 30 mph in nine seconds.

The Centennial Electric weighs 3,250 pounds, including batteries. It stands 53.3 inches high, is 160 inches long, 66.1 inches wide and has a wheelbase of 92 inches. Ground clearance is six inches. It has a low center-of-gravity, because 1,225 pounds of batteries are slung on a movable trolley beneath the vehicle and run nearly its full length. It has no grill, because there is no radiator to cool.

To keep the car low to reduce air drag, as well as to permit easier entry and exiting, the back seats face to the rear and are entered through a hatchback-type rear door. Because the front doors open out and forward on hinged links, they can be opened fully even when the car is parked within 14 inches of an obstacle.

Auxiliary equipment includes a gasoline-type heater, AM/FM/CB radio and electric windshield wipers and defrosters. Fans, headlights and other accessories operate off a standard 12-volt battery, which is connected to an on-board battery charger.

Although the car is not for sale, it was designed to sell for about $6,000 if 100,000 vehicles were manufactured annually in one plant●

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The Endura

Globe-Union, Inc.
5757 Green Bay Avenue,
P.O. Box 591
Milwaukee, Wis. 53201



This four-passenger test car, designed by the world's largest manufacturer of automotive replacement batteries, had its preliminary performance testing during a harsh Milwaukee winter. After an overnight charge, the Endura was driven on suburban streets at city speeds of 30-35 mph for over 100 miles. It also reached speeds in excess of 60 mph under expressway conditions.

The Endura's power source consists of twenty 12-volt, lead-acid Globe-Union electric vehicle batteries mounted on an aluminum frame and roller sub-assembly tray, with access through the front bumper section.

The rear-wheel drive system is powered by a 20 horsepower, 120-volt series wound motor, 0-5000 rpm with 100 cfm forced air cooling. The motor is integrally mounted to a planetary transmission, transaxle and differential arrangement. Total gear ratio reduction 4.93:1.

The body is lightweight fiberglass with integral steel roll cage laminated to the interior for strength. A small spoiler on the undercarriage, plexiglass-covered rectangular headlights, recessed wipers and flush-mounted windshield reduce air flow resistance.

The frame is aluminum alloy for maximum weight savings and corrosion resistance. There is independent front and rear suspension.

Specifications: wheelbase, 108 inches; track front, 60 inches, rear, 58.8 inches; length, 184 inches; width, 72 inches; battery weight, 1,300 lbs; total weight, 3,200 lbs●

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Copper Electric Town Car

Copper Development
Association Inc.
405 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

CDA, the copper and brass industry's advanced market development arm, first introduced its Town Car in 1975. This current model, built by Triad Services to CDA specifications, is the fourth in a series of prototypes, with each representing a technological advance over the previous vehicle.

This advanced Town Car has a range of 120 miles at a cruising speed of 40 mph and a top speed in excess of 55 mph. The hatch-back two-seater weighs 2,972 lbs., including the approximately 1,200 lbs. of its 18 six-volt, lead-acid batteries. The unitized body is constructed of sheet steel external panels with welded box structures and other shapes for reinforcement in keeping with the design requirement that it be adaptable to mass production.



The Copper Electric Town Car has a front wheel drive system, utilizing a specially wound, separately excited electric motor with a matched field control system. It also features regenerative braking, which has resulted in improved range.

Because the doors swing outward far enough to clear the car's body, then travel rearward parallel to the body, easy entry and exiting is possible with just 11 inches of clearance available●

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Test drives

AROUND THE WORLD, PILOT PROJECTS ARE ASSESSING ELECTRIC VEHICLES. HEREWITH, THREE EXAMPLES.

1. POST OFFICE DELIVERY VANS IN CALIFORNIA

by B. W. Burrows, W. J. Wysor and R. J. Hartman, Gould Inc., USA

The largest electric fleet operation in the U.S. today is that of the U.S. Postal Service. In 1975-76, 362 electric vans having a unique propulsion system were completed and delivered. The vehicles are now in service throughout the United States, with the greatest concentration in California. These electric vans, manufactured by AM General, utilize electric propulsion systems designed and manufactured by Gould specifically for the postal delivery type application. The system design stressed high efficiency, safety, cost effectiveness and satisfaction of the specified performance requirements. The key performance requirements in this specification were:

Range: 32 Km (20 miles) with 300 stop/starts

Top Speed: 53 Km/hr (33MPH)

Acceleration: 0 to 48Km/hr (30 miles/hr) in 20 seconds

Gradeability: 0 to 16Km/hr (10MPH) with 122 m (400 ft)

Battery Life: 4 years

The AM General electric van, designated the DJ5E, is a conversion of the standard gasoline-powered van supplied to the U.S Postal Service in large quantities. Suspension and brake modifications were made to accommodate the higher weight of the electric version. Final curb weight of the electric version was 1651 Kg (3,632 lbs.).

In selecting a propulsion system approach and designing the system, major attention was given to the following requirements:

- Efficiency—In order to minimize battery size and vehicle operating cost, the maximum propulsion system efficiency available with state-of-the-art components was sought.
- Performance—The vehicle must satisfy the specified acceleration, top speed, and gradeability requirements but should not significantly exceed these requirements if battery energy consumption is to be minimized.
- Safety—The vehicle must be safe to operate and always under the operator's control. Failures should shut down the system. Shock hazard must be eliminated.
- Maintainability and Serviceability—Easy serviceability was considered critical, with particular attention given to easy battery accessibility and serviceability.
- Life—Long service life is required for cost effective operation. The battery is the largest single contributor to operational cost, thus proper battery selection is important.
- Quiet, Smooth Operation—An electric vehicle is expected to be quiet and smooth, thus particular attention was given to this area.

An additional consideration was component availability on a short time schedule with a minimum of tooling. This latter requirement restricted consideration to DC motors, since AC motor controllers could not be available within the allowable time period. Also, only available production transmissions and final drives could be considered. The U.S. Postal specifications preclude the use of a manual transmission and clutch, thus further restricting the consideration to drive systems that were automatic in nature.

The system selected for this application was the direct-coupled, separately-excited DC motor with a thyristor chopper used for armature voltage and field voltage control. This system offered significant efficiency advantages in all cases plus cost and weight advantages in most cases.

The propulsion battery is the heart of any electric vehicle. The key battery characteristics considered for this application were:

- Life—The specification required a minimum life of four years.
- Energy Density—The battery must have sufficient energy available to allow the vehicle to meet the specified vehicle range of 20 miles with 300 stop/starts per the specified postal mission.
- Power Density—The battery's power output must be adequate to allow the vehicle to meet the acceleration requirements.
- Serviceability—The battery configuration should allow easy servicing, i.e., addition of water, cleaning, etc., when installed in the vehicle.

Of course, only lead-acid batteries were available in a practical sense. From the types available, the semi-industrial battery was chosen as the most cost-effective of those that allowed the vehicle performance requirements to be met.

The completed vehicle has been tested against the requirements of the U.S. Postal Service specification on three occasions. Representative achieved performance is:

Range: 45 Km (28 miles) with 300 stop/starts

From the paper: Semi-Industrial Batteries for Electric Vehicle Fleet Application.

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Cruise Speed: 53-64 Km/hr (33-40 MPH)

Acceleration: 0 to 48 Km/hr (30 MPH) in 20 seconds

Gradeability: 0 to 26 Km/hr (16 MPH) on a 10% grade

The vehicle exceeds by a significant margin all of the specification requirements except acceleration. It just met the acceleration requirements.

Driver acceptance of the vehicle has been generally good. The only consistent complaint among drivers has been the slow acceleration.

Fleet operation has not shown any major design deficiencies associated with the propulsion system drive train. Fleet uptime has stayed over 96 per cent with operation generally in the region of 98 per cent. This is most favorable, considering the newness of the propulsion system design and the very limited test time prior to entering the production phase. Field experience has demonstrated, however, that the problems associated with introducing significant quantities of a new electric vehicle into field use should not be minimized. Minor problems can become major if not remedied promptly. Minor defects become serious if they must be corrected in a large number of vehicles. This must be recognized in any new program and appropriate provisions made to correct expeditiously any problems or defects ●

2.

A CAR FLEET IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

by N.S. Wrench and D.F. Porter, The Electricity Council, United Kingdom

The Electricity Council decided in 1966 to undertake a project with a fleet of electric cars to evaluate the capability of present technology and to quantify the extent of further development necessary. The car is the Enfield 8000, a two-seater saloon, powered by eight traction monobloc batteries and one auxiliary 12V battery. It has a 48V, 6 kW series wound motor, controlled in six stages by voltage switching (12, 24 and 48V) and field weakening at each voltage. There is no regenerative braking. The curb weight of the vehicle is 2,150 lbs (975 kg), and the construction is a steel square tube section chassis with aluminum body panels.

The vehicle is fitted with an on-board dual charger which independently recharges both the 48V and 12V batteries in 8 hours, using a domestic 240V, 13A single phase mains supply.

The maximum speed of the car is 40 mph (64 km/h), and the 0-30 mph (0-48 km/h) acceleration time is 12.5s. Vehicle driving range on a full battery charge is between 24 and 56 miles (39-90 km), depending on driving conditions. The Enfield car meets all current legislative requirements in the UK (no exemptions were sought), including the 30 mph (48 km/h) frontal barrier impact test.

A total of 66 vehicles are participating in a national project organized by the Electricity Council, and they have now been in service for periods of two to three years.

The total fleet mileage is 193,266 miles (310965 km) (April 1978), which corresponds to an average of only 2,928 miles per car. However, there is a wide diversity in the extent to which the cars have been used. There are a number of reasons for this diversity, mainly associated with the manner in which the project was originally organized. As a result, valuable lessons have been learned.

First, the decision to spread the fleet throughout 14 different Electricity Boards resulted in problems of project management and monitoring. On the other hand, in those areas where cars have been grouped in numbers of, say, four or five, it has been possible to develop local centers of expertise and ensure a regular maintenance program, with a resultant higher level of usage and enthusiasm on the part of the staff. The following conclusions can be drawn for those vehicles for which good repair maintenance records exist:

1. Unscheduled repairs, which were running at a fairly high level early in the project, have shown a marked fall, in line with the elimination of "teething troubles" with various components, principally the charger and controller.

2. By far the major item of routine maintenance is the topping up of batteries. The provision of a single point manifold topping up system is seen as an essential feature of future battery designs.

3. The normal automotive and body components of the vehicle have proved very reliable, with a very small servicing requirement, other than that arising from accident damage.

4. There have been no problems at all with the mechanical drive chain. The motor has proved 100% reliable, and no motor maintenance has yet been required.

5. The costs of servicing are dominated by the battery replacement cost. Indeed, battery depreciation is the major factor in vehicle running costs.

It is therefore of paramount importance to develop batteries that not only provide the required range and performance but also have a competitive cost per mile over their life. Having concluded the first phase of the project using SLI batteries, we have now embarked upon a major evaluation program of "lightweight" traction batteries as they become available from various parts of the world. The battery evaluation program is still at an early stage; we plan to expand both the number of types and the numbers of each type on trial in order to gain a comprehensive set of data under a variety of operating conditions.

The incidence of charger faults was high in the early stages of the project and was aggravated by poor quality control in the manufacture of the 48V mains transformer. This problem has now been cured by the substitution of good quality transformers, and these replacements are proving fully reliable.

We feel that there is very substantial scope for improvement in on-board vehicle charger design, particularly with a view to reduc-

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ing its size and weight. In this context, we are following closely the development of high frequency chargers and hope to evaluate this type of charger in the Enfield car during the next phase of the project.

The Enfield project has, over the last 2-3 years, provided us with very valuable information in two general areas: the organization of a major electric vehicle project and the technical aspects of an electric car that require further development.

There are valuable lessons to be learned in the first context, and it is to be hoped that others contemplating EV development and demonstration projects will take note of our experiences, particularly with regard to the way in which vehicles are geographically distributed. A regrouping of larger numbers of vehicles in a smaller number of locations is planned for the Enfield project, and we expect this to prove highly beneficial in terms of vehicle maintenance, project management and monitoring of results●

3.

BUSES IN FRANCE

by M. Moneuse, Electricité de France, France

Electricité de France has been experimenting with electric buses since 1972, utilizing various bus models and operating projects in several different areas.

The most important demonstration of electric buses in France has taken place in Tours. These demonstrations were developed by the local authorities in liaison with the Directors of Electricité de France. They began two years ago in January, 1976, and ended two years later in January, 1978.

A town-center route was specially created for the tests. A run of about 4.5 miles in a figure-eight shape crossed the central area of the town, where little or no service was offered by existing bus lines. After a three-month trial period, the final route was established, with the following operational conditions: flat fare: 1 Fr., free for subscribers; stops at indicated points; possibility of additional stops upon request (both to get on or off); prolonged stop at the railroad station (the central point at the center of the figure eight); service every weekday afternoon; and service frequency fixed at 10 minutes.

This line was developed to contribute to the municipal efforts by ensuring a shuttle service between car parks and the town center. The large number of people who used this line attested to its usefulness, and it is still in service.

The tests were conducted over a period of 19 months (two full years with a 2½ month interruption each summer). Total mileage was 52,100 miles. Significant statistics include:

- Number of buses in use: 4, later 3 (3.6 on average)
- Average monthly mileage: 760 miles per bus
- Average daily run: 37 miles
- Average number of people per day: 450 passengers per bus
- Energy consumption from mains: 3.6 kWh per mile (charger efficiency 83 to 85%)
- Unavailability of vehicles: 12%. Actual unavailability was much less, taking into account the presence of two reserve buses during the first year.

The Tours experiment confirmed the following points:

- A maximum speed of 28 to 31 mph is sufficient for town-center service.
- Industrial lead-acid batteries are preferable to high performance batteries (they were changed at the beginning of 1977 when the buses were modified). Loss of range is largely offset by better battery reliability. Overheating is less (consequently losses), voltage more stable.
- Partial recharges are possible in Tours at the railroad station without disturbing the operational schedule.

Criticisms made by operating staff were on maintenance difficulties with mechanical parts (brakes, suspension, steering) where old or unadapted solutions were chosen, and on difficulties in dealing with batteries. Remarks do not bring into question electric traction, which was appreciated by both drivers and passengers, despite a certain amount of noise made by the vehicles at the end of the tests.

The Tours project and other experiments made by the Study and Research Administration of Electricité de France, involving over a million kilometers for light vehicles (1.2 tons) and 102,000 miles for buses, show essentially that lead-acid batteries of approximately 40 Wh/kg are short-lived, which is highly prejudicial to operational costs of vehicles. The amount entered under the heading "battery" is already 20 to 25% of the total cost in the most favorable circumstances, whereas that under "energy" is only 5%.

Future research should be directed towards looking for a compromise between the following three parameters: size of the battery, its energy-to-weight ratio and its cycle life—resulting in lowest possible operational costs.

The environment of a lead battery will also contribute to its proper utilization.

A centralized and very reliable waterfeed system and, for certain uses, a cooling system of batteries are necessary.

The state-of-charge indicator, apart from its useful psychological role, will make it possible to use batteries for operational purposes at an optimal discharge depth. In this respect the average discharge depth ensuring longest battery life (in miles) is not known. This knowledge would make it possible to lower operating costs. It should be noted that very few state-of-charge indicators for use on urban electric vehicles are available.

To resolve these problems, new experiments on vehicles are necessary. Utility vehicles and buses can be built with present technology to provide numerous services in towns. The French Public Administration is convinced of this and is undertaking work at present on vehicles better conceived than those previously tested●

From the paper: Evaluation of Experiments on Electric Vehicles at EDF up to a Million Kilometers.

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

"Man reached the moon, as predicted, with an electric vehicle. If an electric vehicle can be got to the moon, surely it can be put on the road."

—The Rt. Hon. Lord Ironside
President of the Electric Vehicle Association of Great Britain

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

map by Kenneth Grady

that the slave game was up, Liberia's rulers resigned.

Fortunately, the mantle was passed on to Edwin Barclay, a supreme procrastinator—one able to teach even Ian Smith a thing or two—who demanded that the League first clarify this point, then reconsider that allegation, etc., etc. He befuddled and eventually wore down the international bureaucracy. His deftness was staggering, but luck also was with him. The British parliament chose this moment to kick the Firestone Rubber Company out of Asia. Since Harvey Firestone was hell-bent that "Americans should produce their own rubber," he introduced the rubber tree in Liberia, where it flourished. In return for the entire concession, he laid out five million dollars for defaulted Liberian national debts. This lifted the European bankers off the League's back and the League off Liberia's back. Everyone was happy. President Barclay was particularly relieved when the League soon thereafter fell to pieces, something Ian Smith can only dream about the UN doing.

As in its emblem, the sun has been rising in Liberia ever since. During World War II, the US used it as a staging base, constructed the international airport and built roads (though paved highways now total only 325 miles in a country the size of Ohio). Rubber prices soared during the war; iron ore was later discovered and exports of that too soared. The US has poured in $300 million of aid since World War II.

American aid to Liberia has not gone unrequited. Indeed, Liberians seem the only Africans who simply adore the States. President Carter learned that there was just no way to visit Nigeria (our new darling on the continent, since the former beaus of Ethiopia and Zaire have become disaffected) without gracing Monrovia with a visit. Carter did the absolute minimum. He spent only five hours in the country, half of it along the 35 miles of potholed roads to and from the airport. But the Liberians did the absolute maximum. They crammed into the five hours four separate playings of the American and Liberian national anthems, two 21 gun salutes, and a lavish luncheon at the Executive Mansion. The two presidents immediately hit it off, in prayer if not in politics: Tolbert is a Baptist minister who first met Carter when serving as president of the Baptist World Alliance. Judging by the scores of Liberian postage stamps subsequently issued, showing Jimmy and Rosalynn beaming at the Reverend Mr. Tolbert, you'd think they'd been there for ages.

Yet it all fits into the Liberian ambience, which is distinctly antebellum America. Around Monrovia are run-down mansions with tall white pillars and small neighborhood churches throbbing with hell-and-damnation sermons and stuffed with the fainting faithful each Sunday morning. Sights and sounds of real Africa—of tribal religions, lyric African music, open-air markets—are scarce around the main cities. The "tribal peoples" have been co-opted culturally into the mainstream of Liberian life.

In recent years, class barriers between settler descendants and the "tribal peoples" have begun to break down. In 1962, only 10 percent of the top policymakers (assistant ministers or better) were natives; today the figure is nearly 40 percent. Then they had none of the cabinet posts; today they have nearly a third. Most remarkable, natives hold all top positions in the Commerce Ministry, where personal fortunes are regularly amassed. The student body at the University of Monrovia (like that of Salisbury) has become two-thirds natives.

Not everyone in Liberia is tickled with the pace or scope of change. Disgruntled students claim conditions won't really change until an "indigenous" becomes president (unlikely before the 1990s). But they do acknowledge progress and excitedly describe how a public hanging in February was a big step forward. Seven men from settler families were arrested for committing a macabre ritualistic murder. Witchcraft is the most obvious, if not only, native culture trait adopted by the settlers; good medicine men are on the public payroll to battle sinister medicine men. The "Monrovian Seven" were convicted and then hanged, even though some came from mainline families; one was the son of the True Whig party's national chairman. "In former times, they would have been let off, no doubt," a student said.

Most Liberians are willing to let "majority rule" come about at its own African pace. No "Liberian Liberation Forces" have been organized, and none are envisioned. No pressures exist for UN sanctions until the settlers yield power, and none are envisioned. At least one African internal settlement seems successful.

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Arts and Lives

Stanley Kauffmann on films

Ex-Champions

Hair (United Artists) is chockablock with imaginative lift and pyrotechnical dazzle, all of it apparently intended to forestall question. That question, of course, is: Is *Hair* dated? Well, most of the songs (most of which have been retained from the original score) are still engaging, and much of the filming is fine. But *Hair*, even with its now-blanched script, is about a subject, and 10 years have put that subject in a cooler light.

I saw the first production (1967) at the Public Theater in New York, and beyond this song or that performer, I remember feeling throughout the show that the whole high-ceilinged room was being charged with energy, compressed within the walls, and that the walls might burst. Besides its intrinsics, the show had the added power of the Right Moment. For young people, it was their generation's outburst of protest, of *relief* at being young so that—by non-involvement—they could plead "not guilty" to the corruption with which they charged their elders; for older people it was a reproof by vitality and innocence, reproof particularly about Vietnam.

The subsequent Broadway version seemed both sharper and flatter—sharpened a bit into slickness and flattened out of some of its seeming spontaneity—but its success, there and on the road and around the world, shook the show-biz seismograph. For a time the show had an aura of more than success. In the late 1960s I was on a TV panel in Chicago with a member of the *Hair* touring company who spoke apostolically about it as an instrument that would help to change the world.

The world certainly changed in the 10 years that followed, but one of the changes is that *Hair* and *Hair*-y matters are no longer looked to as instruments of change. Today's equivalent of the *Hair* generation is still a good-sized gap away from older generations but not because of any arrogation of moral superiority by the young. (For one point, the gap between the drafted and the drafters is gone.) This film of *Hair* was made too late for any spontaneous connection with that idea of youth's moral superiority which is still its base. Now our only connection with *Hair* is through its music (by Galt MacDermot); but in the past, though the music was world-famous, it seemed only one aspect of the work's larger existence.

Too recent to be historical even in an era of instant history, too remote to be "now," the film had to be placed somewhere relatively *out* of time in order not to seem dated. That placement was in a context of cinematic splash—a cascade of visual ingenuities so often overwhelming that they almost disguise their (presumable) intent as salvage operation. The screenplay, taken from the original book by Gerome Ragni and James Rado, was evolved by Michael Weller, author of *Moonchildren* (itself an irritatingly self-licking play about 1960s youth). The script tries to keep some motions of social protest, but they are all pallid dilutions. The real achievements are in the filmmaking itself.

Two Czech émigrés are central. I disliked the work of the director, Milos Forman, even before he emigrated. *Loves of a Blonde* and *The Firemen's Ball* were heavy with provincial genius. Forman's first American film, *Taking Off*, strained to prove that he was at home abroad, and didn't. Then he made *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, much of which was admirable, and I thought—still think—that the improvement owed something to the presence in the cast of Jack Nicholson, an experienced filmmaker. *Hair* doesn't need much veristic detail, it mostly exists in a limbo of fantastication, which seems to have touched the latent best in Forman.

Certainly he has been strengthened by working with Miroslav Ondricek with whom he had worked in Czechoslovakia. (A sequence after an LSD "communion" is right out of Czech symbolist films of the mid-1960s.) And the editing—by Lynzee Klingman with Stanley Karnow and Alen Hein—is miraculously deft, an imaginative achievement in itself.

Twyla Tharp's choreography—or rather the use of it by the filmmakers—helps to make the texture of the film. Clearly they all decided not to do a conventional musical with numbers, nor to do a conventional fantasy like *The Wiz*, but to create a free-floating work, hovering a few feet above visible reality and touching it only often enough to push off again. Tharp's movement-designs, running through, help to keep it all suprareal.

For a while, the film looks as if it's going to succeed. The opening sequence shows Claude—played with unostentatious reticence by John Savage of *The Deer Hunter*—leaving his ranch home and going to New York to be drafted. (No questions, please, about a westerner going to NY to report.) As his bus enters the Lincoln Tunnel, blackness hits the screen; then that blackness is flecked with lights—not headlights, as we soon see, but the lights of a celebration in Central Park (where Claude later appears), and the picture is off, or seems to be.

A lot of the blends and braids of the film are extemely clever, sometimes lyrically lovely. All the songs are well

Films Worth Seeing

The China Syndrome. Really thrilling thriller about nuclear energy. The villainy is logically questionable, but the action sizzles.

The Deer Hunter. Pennsylvania sport and Vietnam horror seen through the prism of male rituals. Stretched but serious.

Norma Rae. She's a mill hand in the South fighting to start a union. A very moving, endearing film, even if a bit naive.

Real Life. Frequently amusing spoof on the making of a documentary like *An American Family*. With Albert Brooks of *Saturday Night Live*.

SK

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sung and are never simply "held" as songs: the camera movement and editing help to dramatize them. But the staled topicality of the original show keeps wearing through and distancing us. The small band of hippies led by Berger now seem only scruffy tramps, not a statement of anything. Berger's courageous moral stances, in the light of the last 10 years and stripped of the horrible pressures of Vietnam, now seem merely juvenile and silly. And the oppressive Treat Williams in the role doesn't help.

When Berger leads his friends to a stately surburban home, where he dances on a long polished dinner table and outrages the stuffy guests, it now seems to shame *him*, not them. When Groucho Marx did that sort of thing with Margaret Dumont, he assumed no moral superiority: it was just an appeal to the fat-man-and-banana-peel anarchy in us. Berger is proclaiming a moral and ethical superiority that today seems dated and dumb. I couldn't wait for the cops to come and take him away. This response, or variants of it, recurred.

Still, in a film world where naturalism is taken as primal law, the fanciful leap of *Hair* provides some relief. Six years ago the English director David Greene made the same sort of leap with *Godspell* (*TNR*, May 12, 1973). In a more modest film, Greene had proportionately more success. (Coincidence: both films of American "youth" musicals were done by foreign-born directors.) But at least the makers of *Hair* have given us some high-spirited reminders of splendid things that film can do and, these days, isn't often asked to.

Syrup seems to find its own level—just like water, only it takes a bit longer. The Italian director Franco Zeffirelli oozed his way through *Romeo and Juliet* (1968), then a film about Saint Francis called *Brother Sun, Sister Moon* (1973), then a six-hour life of Christ made for Italian TV. To speak gently, artist and subjects were mismatched. Now at last Zeffirelli has slurped his way to the right material for his soda-fountain-in-excelsis style: a remake of *The Champ* (MGM), a weepie done first in 1931 with Wallace Beery and Jackie Cooper. (It was remade once before, in 1953, as *The Clown*, with Red Skelton.)

The script, rewritten by Walter Newman, falls between two stools. (A pun, that.) It's corn, but not sincere enough to be good corn. The music by Dave Grusin is exactly the right ladle for the director's syrup—or shovel for the script.

Jon Voight is an ex-champion boxer, now a boozing race-track hand, who tries to make a comeback for the sake of his seven-year-old boy. Faye Dunaway is his ex-wife, now married to rich Arthur Hill. If there were Oscars for Keeping a Straight Face, those three would be sure winners.

Three concepts of liberalism

A conversation with Ronald Dworkin

A fuller version of this interview will appear in the chapter "Philosophy and Politics" in Bryan Magee's Men of Ideas, *to be published in May by Viking. It is one in a series of interviews with outstanding contemporary thinkers conducted by Bryan Magee, lecturer in philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford. Many of the interviews first appeared in a highly acclaimed BBC television series.*

Introduction

Bryan Magee: During the Second World War there was a strong shared feeling among the Western Allies that what they were fighting for was the freedom of the individual, and that this meant in practice defending liberal-democratic institutions. The feeling saturates the only major work of political philosophy to have been written during that war, *The Open Society and its Enemies* by Karl Popper, published in 1945. And for a couple of decades after the war there was something like a liberal consensus in the Western democracies—so much so that people started talking about 'the end of ideology,' as if there were no



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more political arguments left to have about fundamentals. In England a slogan which came to be widely quoted in academic circles was: 'Political philosophy is dead.'

Perhaps a reaction against this was inevitable sooner or later. When it began to show itself, in the mid-1960s, it came from both directions, right and left. Conservatives began to feel that in some ways there had come to be too much freedom for the individual—for example with regard to sexual permissiveness, and pornography, and the use of drugs, and what they regarded as a failure to keep down crime, especially crimes of violence. They felt, too, that a whole generation of young people had been allowed to grow up in this social atmosphere without the restraints of traditional disciplines and punishments, and that the results now beginning to manifest themselves were disastrous. At the same time, from the far left—many of whose members themselves belonged to the so-called permissive generation—liberal-democratic regimes came under attack for entirely different reasons: they were accused of making little serious attempt to redistribute wealth or abolish poverty; the societies over which they presided were said to be class-ridden and racist and sexist; and worst of all, they were held responsible for the prolongation of a bestial war in Vietnam.

So debate over fundamentals in politics began again, in very earnest, and now the debate was about the validity of the kind of liberal-democratic institutions that had for so long formerly been taken for granted. Perhaps because these controversies were at their hottest in the United States, it was there that the chief figures to be thrown up by the new wave of political thought emerged. And for all the reasons I've outlined, their work tended to take the form of a new defense of liberal democracy—or rather new defenses, because even their main arguments sometimes differed from each other. In the academic world the most influential of the various books to come out of this so far is *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls, a professor at Harvard, published in 1972. And perhaps the next best known is *Anarchy, State and Utopia* by another Harvard professor, Robert Nozick, published in 1974. If one were to add a third name to this list it would be that of the chief protagonist in the present discussion, Ronald Dworkin, also an American, and a former professor at Yale, but now resident in England as professor of jurisprudence at Oxford. Dworkin's book, *Taking Rights Seriously*, published in 1977, met with acclaim which ranged from the severest academic approval to a feature article in *Time* magazine—which latter I take to be an indication that it impinged on popular as well academic thinking.

Discussion

Bryan Magee: Before I start questioning you about your work and that of your colleagues, is there anything you'd like to add to what I've just said, by way of introduction, about the historical and social context in which that work has emerged?

Ronald Dworkin: It's interesting, isn't it, that so many of the social problems in America you spoke about were part of the racial issue? Many of them had to do with the Civil Rights Movement, in the first instance, and then with the special problems caused by extensive welfare programs, in cities like New York. These programs principally helped the blacks and Puerto Ricans and were increasingly at the expense of people who formerly thought of themselves as the working classes—the taxi drivers, for example, who began to question liberal premises that were no longer benefiting them but benefiting people still worse off. Liberalism suddenly became controversial in new quarters. There's another dimension to these developments. When the New Left attacked first the policy in Vietnam and then liberalism generally, they took themselves to be attacking not just a particular political theory but the whole idea of a rational, logically developed political theory. So that when John Rawls wrote his book, *A Theory of Justice*, it was a defense of traditional liberal values, but it was also, at the same time, a defense of the whole idea of using philosophy to support political positions. . . . It's hard to read a legal treatise today without finding him mentioned two or three times. In Britain as well as in America, any academic or learned discussion of social policy contains the almost obligatory reference to Rawls—sometimes in such language as to make me think the author hasn't understood, or perhaps even read, his book. But what influence!

> *What conclusions does [Rawls's] method yield? There are two, and Rawls calls them 'the two principles of justice' . . . . First, everyone shall have the basic liberties . . . in the greatest amount consistent with everyone having the basic liberties equally. . . . Second, no difference in wealth is to be tolerated unless that difference works for the benefit of the worst-off group in the society.*

B.M.: Is it possible, before we consider the actual content of his thought, to explain why he's having this kind of influence?

R.D.: I think there are two reasons. First, something I've already mentioned, which is that he stands not only for a particular theory but for a majestic demonstration of the power of argument in politics. People are once again attracted to the idea that a sustained argument, which begins with principles that can plausibly be taken to be first principles, can actually tell us what to do about tort law, or about the distribution of milk to schoolchildren. Second, the conclusions that he reaches have, quite apart from the argument, enormous intuitive appeal to people of good will. They're very attractive conclusions.

B.M.: I know this is a tall order, but is it possible for you to summarize Rawls's central thesis in a way that gives some indication of why it is so influential?

R.D.: I'll try. It would be a good idea to distinguish two aspects of the book: the method Rawls suggests and employs, and the conclusions he reaches. I think it's useful to distinguish them because some people are impressed with the one and not the other. The method is arresting.

Rawls tells us that when we're concerned with basic questions of justice, when we wish to discover the rules that would provide the basic structure of a just society, we ought to proceed in the following way. We ought to tell ourselves a fairy story. We ought to imagine a congress of men and women, who don't belong to any particular society yet, and have come together in a kind of constitutional convention to choose the fundamental rules for a society to be formed. They're like everyone else, these people. They have specific identities, specific weaknesses, specific strengths, specific interests. But they suffer from the most crippling kind of amnesia. They don't know who they are. They don't know whether they're old or young, men or women, black or white, talented or stupid. In particular—and this is very important—they don't know their own beliefs about what is valuable in life. Each one actually has some conception of what he wants for his life to be like, what his preferences are in sexual morality and so forth, but no one knows

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what his views are on those questions. So it's as if, in Rawls's phrase, they were separated from their personalities by a veil of ignorance. Now, these amnesiacs nevertheless must agree on a political constitution. Rawls says if we ask ourselves what people in this strange situation would agree upon by way of a constitution, each one acting only in rational pursuit of his own self-interest, the answer to that question will be, for that reason, principles of justice.

It is of course far-fetched to assume that anything like this convention actually has happened or even that it could happen. The story is a dramatic way of asking people to imagine themselves making choices in their own self-interest but without knowing things which distinguish the interests of one from those of another, and that's of course just a way of enforcing a certain conception of equality on political decisions. But, for the moment, I think it's better not to leave behind the myth, because the myth itself has great power. The question is, what would people in this situation agree upon?

That leads to the second aspect of the book. What conclusions does this method yield? There are two, and Rawls calls them 'the two principles of justice.' They are principles, I should say, for a society with a certain measure of economic development, so that there's enough food for everyone, for example. Once you've reached that point, says Rawls, people in the original position, as he calls this strange situation, would agree on the following two principles. First, everyone shall have the basic liberties, which Rawls enumerates, in the greatest amount consistent with everyone having the basic liberties equally. These basic liberties include the conventional political liberties—liberty to vote, liberty to speak on political matters, freedom of conscience; they also include freedom to hold personal property, to be protected in your person, not to be arrested suddenly and without due cause, and so on. What you might call the conventional liberal liberties are protected in this way. Second, no difference in wealth is to be tolerated unless the difference works for the benefit of the worst-off group in the society. It is a very dramatic principle, this second principle. Suppose some change in economic structure would make the very rich much richer, the middle classes much poorer. . . . The change must be made if the result is to benefit the very poorest group, however small.

So you must have two principles: the first is the principle that says there are certain liberties that must be protected, the second is the rather more egalitarian principle that says: 'Look to the situation of the worst-off group. Every change in the social structure should benefit that group.' The two principles are related through what Rawls calls 'the principle of priority.' The first principle dominates the second. Even if, for example, it would benefit the worst-off group in the society to abridge political liberties—take away rights of free speech—that must not be done. Only when liberty has been protected to the full are you entitled to consider the economic questions raised by the second principle. When you do come to those economic considerations, you must benefit the worst-off class, but you can't do even that until everyone's liberties are sufficiently protected.

B.M.: This principle that the welfare of the worst-off must be of primary consideration is strange in a double sense. First, it's counter-historical. There has never been a society that operated on this principle, not even the most democratic of the liberal democracies. Second, it's counter-intuitive: it's not the way we 'naturally' think. And it's not at all clear why it should be considered a principle of *justice*, either.

R.D.: We must distinguish two different questions. One is, 'Does Rawls prove that?' Does he prove that people in his original position would in fact select that second principle? Second, quite apart from the question of whether he proves it, does it have any appeal to us? Now, as to the second, it has a very strong appeal to me, I must say, and it has had to many people. It can be carried to extremes. Obviously, you can imagine situations in which it would seem mad to most people to follow it. The principle might require sacrifices from better-off people in order to give the starving poor of India each one more bowl of rice, which would make no great difference in fact to their lives. But the general idea that sympathy, a sense of respect for your fellow human beings, compels you to pay attention to those whose needs are greatest seems to me compelling.

It's a much more difficult question for me whether in fact this compelling principle follows from Rawls's method—that is, whether he can demonstrate that people in his original position would choose it. After all, his


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argument is that they would choose that principle in their own self-interest. His argument is that people disabled as these people are—not knowing anything about themselves—would say to themselves: 'Look, if I choose rules that are appropriate, say, to Florence in the Renaissance, then I might be a prince. I might, on the other hand, be a lowly serf. If I pick Rawls's second principle I'm at least putting a floor beneath the worst I can be. I'll be as well off, in the worst position, as anyone in the worst position possibly can be.' Now Rawls says people would play it safe, in the original position, and choose his second principle. His critics say he has no right to assume that. Some people are, by nature, gamblers and would choose Florence. Others are, by nature, extremely conservative, fearful people, and they would choose Rawls's second principle. If we make no assumption about their temperament, we cannot prove which they would choose.

B.M.: I have trouble with this whole notion of the original position. Of course, as you have made entirely clear, Rawls puts it forward as a kind of myth, but nevertheless it strikes me as a somewhat thin, even frivolous myth. It puts me in mind of a board game, of people sitting down to a table to play something like Monopoly, and adopting rules of this kind because before they start they don't know whether they're going to end up as individuals with hotels on Mayfair and Park Lane and a pile of money, or with nothing. And it's in the nature of the rules of a game that they have to be the same for all players, or for any player in a given position. But all this, it seems to me, bears excessively little relation to the historical realities out of which actual societies emerge, and which therefore shape them, and the social realities in which actual individuals find themselves—and therefore the real factors to which political philosophies need to relate.

R.D.: We're not concerned with the historical question here. We're not concerned about how principles are in fact chosen. We're concerned about which principles are just. The root conception behind Rawls's original position, he tells us, is the idea of justice as fairness, fair play. Now, you said when people are going to play a game they pick rules which seem fair without knowing what the outcome of the game will be. It seems wrong if players argue for a particular rule because they know it will favor the position they expect to occupy. Rawls argues that that intuition, though you appeal to it in a frivolous context, is in fact a very deep intuition and that it holds for society as a whole. The question of justice is just the question: 'Which rules would people agree to if they didn't know whether they were rich or skillful or had intelligent parents?' That, it seems to me, is part of the intuitive appeal of the position. Now, I should add that I share some of your dissatisfaction. I think that the myth, the strategy, is presented without enough background, and that one would want to ask the following question: 'What does one have to assume, as a kind of deep theory, about the rights of citizens, about the fundamentals of political justice, in order to show why the device, and the idea of justice as fairness, is appealing?' That's the question that Rawls makes us think about.

B.M.: Having defended Rawls against an implied criticism of mine, will you now go on to say what you yourself regard as the chief shortcomings of his theory?

R.D.: The idea of the original position—powerful and arresting as it is—takes on too much of a life of its own in the book. Rawls spends too much time, I think, trying to show that people in the original position would inevitably choose his two principles over alternatives that come to mind, and he falls back, in this demonstration, on quite complex economic arguments that do not entirely succeed. This exaggerates the importance of that demonstration: it suggests that the original position is an axiomatic or self-evident starting point, so that everything turns on whether substantive conclusions follow by inexorable logic from that self-evident start. Some readers therefore think that if they can discover any flaw in the argument supposed to demonstrate this (like the difficulty posed by the claim that some people in the original position might be gamblers by nature) then Rawls's whole enterprise is defeated. Readers are also confused when Rawls says, as he does, that some features of the original position are fixed just so that it will produce the two principles he favors. That sounds like loading the dice. . . .

So my first complaint is largely a complaint about presentation. Rawls sometimes seems to make more turn on the argument from the original position, particularly the economic aspects of the argument, than is necessary, given his general philosophical ambitions. My second complaint is more substantive. The argument Rawls gives for the first principle—the principle that requires a priority for liberty—is very weak. He argues that every rational person would prefer, once the minimum conditions of life are satisfied, to have more of the liberties he lists than any further improvement in material wealth. But that seems, as a matter of experience, an unjustified assumption. In fact, I do not think that the principle of the priority of liberty can be generated by the original position device. Rawls must show, not that people in the original position would choose the priority of liberty, but that this priority is necessary to the equality of position which constitutes the original position. He could do that only by assuming a preference for these liberties as part of the design of the original position. That would of course make the device that much less attractive, because that much more of the conclusions would be built into the position itself. But, as I just said, I do not think that the device is in any case as important as first appears.

But the complaints I have just made illustrate the greatest virtue of the book. Its importance is not exhausted by the particular arguments it makes. It presents the reader with an enterprise

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and invites him to join it. It says to the reader: 'If these conclusions are appealing to you, if the idea that we must think about justice by thinking about fairness seems right, then why is this so?' The book has, in fact, launched an enterprise of thinking along these lines, of which Rawls would be the first to say that his own book is not the last word. Each person who reads the book will have a different version of what the enterprise is. I, for one, have a particular view of the enterprise that makes the book very important to me. There are two possible general approaches to the question of what social arrangements are just. One approach says that the answer to 'What is justice?' depends upon the answer to a further question, namely: 'What kind of lives should men and women lead? What counts as excellence in a human being?' The liberal rejects that approach to justice. He says that justice is independent of any particular notion of what the good life is. . . . Rawls's book is an attempt to show how far an appealing and altruistic and humane political theory can be generated that is based on this second, liberal approach.

B.M.: Both conservatives and people of the radical left tend to regard the individual as predominantly a social animal, and to think that political theory not only usually does but always should (and perhaps cannot but) embody within itself a conception of how individuals ought to live. But the liberal believes that how individuals live is something for individuals themselves to decide wherever possible. Therefore liberals do not *want* a political theory that holds out a particular life for the individual, however attractive (not to say 'ideal'). And they are opposed to any form of society that tries to impose such an ideal.
R.D.: Not because the liberal is skeptical, not because the liberal says there is no answer to the question of how human beings should live, but rather because he insists, for a variety of reasons, that the answer must be given by each person for himself and that it's the utmost insult to attempt to decide that question socially for individuals.

B.M.: Indeed, one of his criticisms of the conservative or the radical leftist would be that they assume the answer is the same for everyone.
R.D.: Yes. Not because he assumes that different answers are right—he needn't be a relativist—but because he insists that it robs people of personality and dignity to answer for them, whether they give the right or the wrong answer.

B.M.: So, far from the believing that other people's answers are necessarily correct, the real liberal will passionately believe in their right to live in ways of which he disapproves.
R.D.: Yes. Except, of course, that they must not live *unjustly*, according to the liberal's conception of justice. They must not act so as to deny others the same independence. Rawls argues, as I understand the book, that this familiar liberal caveat is a powerful qualification, because it requires, among other things, the second principle of justice.

II

B.M.: I think you've given, if I may say so, an excellent exposition of Rawls in an almost impossibly short space. Now I'd like to move on to the second important book I named in my introduction: *Anarchy, State and Utopia* by Robert Nozick. Could I ask you to do for Nozick, perhaps even more briefly, what you've just done for Rawls?
R.D.: I'll try. Nozick starts his book with a proposition remarkable in its simplicity. Individuals have rights, he says, and these rights consist exclusively in rights not to have their persons injured or their liberty limited or their personal property taken without their consent. Nozick believes these rights of person and property to be absolute, and, since governments typically constrain liberty and take property (through taxes and otherwise), Nozick's claim raises the question of whether there can be any government that does not systematically violate the rights of its citizens. So Nozick devotes the first—and in many ways the most impressive—part of his book to showing how some sort of State can be justified in spite of the fact that individuals have the rights he says they have. The particular problem he finds most difficult is this: States claim the power to monopolize the use of force, and to forbid their citizens from using force themselves, even to take back property stolen from them.

B.M.: Surely any State must prevent the citizen from taking the law into his own hands.
R.D.: Yes. But according to Nozick's basic assumptions, I have a right to take my own property back, and to do other things necessary to protect my basic rights to property and to the liberty of my person. But he concedes that if everyone used force when he thought his rights were violated, chaos would follow. So he puts this question: can the

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State be justified in averting this chaos by claiming and exercising a monopoly of force? He argues that it can be justified, under certain circumstances, in acting in this way. His argument is very complex and impressive, though I have some doubt that it is entirely successful. But, in any event, the upshot of the argument is that there can legitimately be what Nozick calls 'a night-watchman State,' which means a State that exists simply to protect property and person, to punish people on behalf of other people. The question then arises: 'Can the State do any more than that?' After all, modern states do a lot more than that. They tax you and me and use our money to help other people or to do things in the common interest. Nozick gives that question a very firm answer. No. The State may not do anything except act as a night-watchman. It may not tax, for example, for any purpose other than supporting the police and similar services. There are no doubt a lot of people reading this discussion who would feel some sympathy with that view. Nozick has been rather popular in certain political circles, at least for this part of his views.

Now, what argument does he give for limiting the role of the State to this minimal or night-watchman role? His argument is typically ingenious and complex but the main thrust comes to this. Nozick offers a theory of just distribution of assets which he calls an historical theory. Whether a particular distribution of Nozick's term for goods—'holdings'—is just depends entirely upon how each person came to have the holdings he has. In a modern society, most of the holdings each person has were formerly held by someone else. If a person's holdings were acquired from others with their consent—either by gift or exchange—then these holdings are just. If they were acquired from others by some form of theft (or if those others acquired them by theft in the past) then the holdings are not just. This is about all there is to it. On this theory justice is a matter of history, and not a matter of what Nozick calls a *pattern*. It is not a matter, that is, of whether the holdings people now have conform to some scheme, independent of history, about how the holdings of one person should relate to the holdings of others, or how they should relate to merit, or anything of that sort. Now a State that is more active than Nozick's minimal State must be following some patterned theory of justice. It taxes some people to provide services to others on the theory, for example, that justice requires that no one be subjected to great poverty if others have much more than they need. It is not content, as Nozick's State is, to leave distribution to history.

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Nozick starts his book with a proposition remarkable in its simplicity. Individuals have rights, he says, and these rights consist exclusively in rights not to have their persons injured or their liberty limited or their property taken without their consent. Nozick believes these rights of person and property to be absolute, and, since governments typically constrain liberty and take property (through taxes and otherwise), Nozick's claim raises the question of whether there can be any government that does not systematically violate the rights of its citizens. . . . Nozick argues that any theory that takes rights seriously must condemn the practices of the welfare state.

So Nozick argues for his own theory of the minimal State by arguing against all patterned theories of justice. Suppose, he says, that you could collect everyone's property and then distribute it according to your favorite pattern of justice. If you were a strict egalitarian, for example, you would divide all the property you collected into equal shares and give each citizen one share. But as soon as your back is turned (Nozick argues) citizens will engage in trades and bargains so that the pattern you imposed is forever broken. Suppose one of your citizens is Wilt Chamberlain. Millions of other citizens will be willing each to pay him 25 cents to induce him to play basketball for them to watch. He will then become vastly richer than any of them. In order to prevent that you will have to prohibit people from making bargains they wish to make. You will have to establish a tyranny constantly interfering with the liberty of citizens. So a patterned theory—if we are serious about it—turns out to be an excuse for the most systematic form of tyranny. Hence the historical theory of Nozick, and the minimal, night-watchman State it supports, is the only acceptable theory of justice.

B.M.: What do you regard as the chief shortcomings in Nozick's theory?

R.D.: Two. First, his theory of what rights people have, independently of any State, seems entirely arbitrary. It is true that the idea that people have a right not to lose anything they possess without their consent has a certain intuitive appeal. But other ideas also have intuitive appeal, such as the idea that people in a desperate situation have a right to the concern of others. Of course if some other fundamental, pre-political right were recognized, like the right to the concern of others in emergencies, then Nozick's argument for the minimal State would be undercut. I agree that rights ought not to be violated. But sometimes claims of right conflict, and I see no reason why Nozick's right to property is exclusive of other rights, or why it is necessarily more important than others. Second, his arguments tend to be all-or-nothing arguments that are flawed for that reason. The Wilt Chamberlain argument is a good example. It would be unattractive, and perhaps tyrannical, for a society to prohibit all voluntary exchanges that produce inegalitarian distributions. But it doesn't follow from the fact that a great interference with that sort of liberty is a great injustice, that smaller, selective interferences are small injustices.

B.M.: In American and British society we have the State constantly interfering with exchanges, yet it would be quite untrue to say that these are dictatorships.

R.D.: Yes, exactly. There might well be a threshold of degree of interference that must be crossed before anyone's rights have been violated. Obviously there is a big difference between taxing Wilt Chamberlain at the end of a year on the profits he has made, and prohibiting him from asking whatever he wants to play basketball, or prohibiting those who want to pay what he asks from doing so. Nozick, however, would not agree with you that the United States and Britain are plainly not dictatorships. He believes that taxation for redistribution is a form of slavery.

B.M.: In view of the fact that Nozick's models are so far removed from reality, wherein lies the interest of reading him?

R.D.: . . . Nozick's book is valuable because it's a great challenge to those (I am one) who think that rights are very important. Nozick argues that any theory that takes rights seriously must condemn the practices of the welfare

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state. It is possible, as I've suggested, to meet his arguments, but they must be met.

III

B.M.: Now, finally, I want to turn to your own work. How does what you are doing relate to what Rawls and Nozick are doing?

R.D.: In a way, we're all working the same street. If you accept the characterization of liberalism I offered earlier—that liberalism is the theory that makes the content of justice independent of any particular theory of human virtue or excellence—then we're all trying, though in different ways, to define and defend the consequences of liberalism so conceived. As you will have gathered, I am much more in sympathy with Rawls than I am with Nozick. But the disagreements we have with one another can be exhibited, at least from the standpoint I believe important, by attending to the familiar idea that liberty and equality are sometimes in conflict, so that a choice or compromise is necessary. Nozick takes an extreme position, off on one side. He says that liberty is everything, and equality nothing, except as it may be the accidental by-product of free exchanges, which is extremely improbable. When Rawls displays his two principles of justice, on the other hand, it looks, at least on the surface, as if he's attempting to make a compromise between the two ideals. . . . For my part, I'm anxious to contest the assumption that any of the conventional basic liberties we call rights are in conflict with equality at any fundamental level. Individual rights, in my view, make most sense if we conceive them as necessary to any defensible theory of what equality requires. I want to change the terms of the orthodox debate by asking, about any claim of an individual right to liberty, not 'How much equality must we give up to respect this right adequately?,' but rather 'Is this right necessary to protect equality?' I want to defend liberalism from the charge that it protects individuals at the cost of the welfare of those at the bottom of society. Nozick pleads guilty to that charge, but claims that guilt as a virtue. Rawls argues for both liberty, in the shape of certain basic liberties, and welfare for the worst-off group; but his theory seems to separate the two conceptually, and connects them only in the dubious claim that people in the original position would want both in that order. I have tried to argue that economic equality and the familiar individual rights stem from the same fundamental conception of equality as independence, so that equality is the motor of liberalism, and every defense of liberalism is also a defense of equality.

B.M.: So you deny—what many people assert—that the notion of individual rights and the notion of equality come into conflict: on the contrary, you say, they are mutually supportive. But isn't the idea of individual rights opposed to another political ideal, namely the idea that political decisions should aim to serve not the special interests of particular individuals demanding their 'rights,' but the general good?

R.D.: Yes, that is so, at least on the surface. Indeed, I think that the only clear and useful definition of what a right is uses this opposition between rights and the general welfare. Someone has a right, in this strong and useful sense, when he is entitled to insist on doing something or having something even though the general welfare is harmed thereby. So someone has a genuine right to free speech only if he is entitled to speak his mind on political matters even when, for some reason, the average person in the community is made worse off when he does so. Rights, on this account, are trumps held by individuals over the general or average good. . . . One virtue of this account of rights is that it shows that rights cannot be taken for granted, or simply taken as axiomatic, as Nozick takes his right to personal liberty and property to be. After all, if someone is entitled to insist on something even though others suffer more in welfare than he gains, then he is making a very strong claim that begs for a justification. If it really would threaten economic stability to permit an individual to criticize the government whenever and wherever he wishes, and many people would then suffer, then it is not intuitively obvious that he is entitled to criticize it in that event. If we believe that he does have a right to speak freely even in that circumstance (which I do) then we must show why. . . .

I want to show, not that rights are necessary because of a fundamental value that is in opposition to the general welfare, but rather that the idea of rights and the idea of the general welfare are *both* rooted in the same, more fundamental value. After all, just as it seems arbitrary to insist on rights as fundamental and axiomatic, it seems equally arbitrary to insist on the general

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

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welfare as of fundamental or axiomatic importance. It is frequently thought that the general welfare is of fundamental importance because pleasure (or happiness, or the satisfaction of desires or preferences) is a good in itself. Suppose a particular economic decision (like an incomes policy) will disadvantage some people but work to the long-term benefit of more people. Then, on this theory, it will produce more pleasure (or happiness) overall, after subtracting the pain caused to the few from the pleasure given to the many, than the opposite decision would produce. If pleasure is a good in itself, then it is better to have more rather than less of it overall, and that is why the general welfare, rather than benefit to particular individuals, is of decisive importance.

But this defense of the idea of the general welfare, though familiar, seems very weak. Isn't it absurd to suppose that pleasure (or happiness, or the satisfaction of desires) is a good in itself? Some of Rawls's best arguments are directed to showing that this idea is in fact as absurd as it seems. So if we really do think that the general welfare is an important consideration in political affairs, we must find a better explanation of why. I think we can find a better explanation in the idea of equality. If one decision would benefit a great many people to a certain degree and harm a few others to the same degree, and the governors of society choose the opposite decision, then they are showing favoritism to the few. The only way to treat all citizens as equals is to show the same concern for the fate of each; it follows that, all else being equal, a gain to many must be preferred over a gain to a few. Bentham (whose utilitarian philosophy provides the most dramatic defense of the idea of the general welfare) made this point himself. He said that the strategy of pursuing the general welfare counts each man as one and no one as more than one.

So the idea of the general welfare is in fact rooted in the more fundamental idea of equality. But (as I said earlier) that fundamental idea also supports the idea of individual rights as, under certain circumstances, trumps over the general welfare. The apparent opposition between rights and the general good, on which the definition I proposed relies, is just an opposition on the surface. The package of the two ideas—allowing the general welfare to be a good justification of political decisions in the normal case but providing individual rights as trumps over that justification in exceptional cases—serves equality better than simply allowing the general welfare to be the ultimate justification in all cases. . . .

B.M.: When you said a moment ago that you, Rawls and Nozick are all working the same street, I think you said something extremely important. Academics are commonly inclined to regard at least Rawls and Nozick as polar opposites, whereas according to your analysis what they are both doing, and you also are doing, is defending liberalism. Mind you, the three of you are not just producing different defenses of liberalism: nevertheless that *is* what you are doing—which means there is something loosely yet very importantly in common about your various positions. Where is what you have in common most vulnerable? And—obviously arising out of that, and connected with it—where is the most important and interesting work in your kind of political thinking likely to come in the near future?

For my part, I'm anxious to contest the assumption that any of the conventional basic liberties we call rights are in conflict with equality at any fundamental level. Individual rights, in my view, make most sense if we conceive them as necessary to any defensible theory of what equality requires. I want to change the terms of the orthodox debate by asking about any claim of an individual right to liberty, not 'How much equality must we give up to respect this right adequately?', but rather 'Is this right necessary to protect equality?'. . . . I want to defend liberalism from the charge that it protects individuals at the cost of those at the bottom of society.

R.D.: I did say that we were all 'working the same street,' but I want to make plain that we each have very different theories. My point was that we were each offering a conception of liberalism—an account of what follows from the basic liberal idea that justice must be independent of any idea of human excellence or of the good life. Nozick's book, as I said, is a great challenge to liberals, because he argues that the consequences of liberalism are consequences that most liberals would hate, though Nozick does not. So it is important for liberals to show that Nozick is wrong. My argument—that liberalism requires equality, and that equality is at the bottom not only of economic but also of political rights—is an attempt to show that these more attractive conclusions are the true consequences of liberalism. But we are all together, as I said, in accepting the liberal attitude which insists that government must not force a conception of the good life upon its citizens, or justify political decisions by preferring one vision of human excellence to another.

This fundamental liberal attitude must now be defended against two attacks from non-liberals of the left and right—one theoretical and one practical. The theoretical attack argues that liberalism rests on a nihilistic or otherwise unattractive or impoverished view of human nature and what human beings are. You said, at one point in our discussion, that these opposing views take the position that man is social. Of course, the liberal doesn't deny that, but the argument is that liberalism is committed to what's often called a Humean, or Benthamite, or atomistic conception of human nature. It is absolutely necessary for liberals now to demonstrate that this is not true and to show that the true father of liberalism is not Bentham, who is in fact rather an embarrassment for liberals, but Kant, whose conception of human nature cannot be called impoverished. The practical problem is this: there are certain things we all want government to do. We want government, for example, to select methods of education, to sponsor culture, and to do much else that looks, on the surface, like endorsing one set of personal values against another and therefore contradicting liberalism. It is very important for liberals to develop a theory that would make a distinction here between enriching the choices available to people and enforcing a choice upon people. The crucial idea, it seems to me, is the idea of imagination. The liberal is concerned to expand imagination without imposing any particular choice upon imagination. But I've simply named a problem, I haven't met it. It does seem to me that liberalism is rather weak at this point and needs a theory of education and a theory of culture-support that it does not have. That, I think, is part of the answer to the question: 'Where must political theory go?'

You said, in your introduction to this discussion, that for a long time people thought that political philosophy was

Coming:
Richard Hall on the
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dead. Well, political philosophy has been born again and is very alive now. But what hasn't quite happened yet is the reintegration of political philosophy into the body of philosophy as a whole. Of course no philosophical problem worth talking about can be pulled apart from the general body of philosophy, and that is certainly true of the two questions I just mentioned—the question of what theory of mind is assumed by liberalism, and the question of distinguishing between enriching and constricting imagination. It's plain that political theory must escape what is normally thought to be the boundaries of questions of political institutions or strategy and must encounter, as all the great philosophers of the past did, the connections between political philosophy and just philosophy.

B.M.: It's a striking fact, as you imply, that most of the very greatest political philosophers of the past—Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Kant—were not specialists in political philosophy at all, but general philosophers whose political philosophy was simply a part of their general philosophy.

R.D.: Yes. That's the next step.

Books Considered

Munich: The Price of Peace by Telford Taylor

(Doubleday; $17.50)

Poets are often the best commentators on world politics, and in his "Autumn Journal: 1938" Louis MacNeice came closer to capturing the mood of shamefaced relief with which the democratic countries received the news of the Munich accord than most of the newspaper pundits.

. . . once again
The crisis is put off and things look better . . .
And negotiation wins
If you can call it winning,
And here we are—just as before—safe in our skins;
Glory to God for Munich.
And stocks go up and wrecks
Are salved and politicians' reputations
Go up like Jack-on-the-Beanstalk; only the Czechs
Go down and without fighting.

Even in the midst of the acclamations that greeted Neville Chamberlain when he returned from Germany, it took a determined effort of will to pretend that anything substantial had been gained; and, when the terms of the agreement were published, a disgusted Labour M.P. said, "If that's all he could get, why did he go to Munich? He could have written that on the back of a dirty postcard and sent it home from Brighton!"

The agreement that the prime minister thought would bring peace in our time merely convinced the dictators that new aggression would not be resisted. Within six months Nazi tanks were rolling into Prague and Ribbentrop was telling the Polish ambassador that Germany would not wait indefinitely for a settlement of the question of Danzig and the Corridor. At long last appeasement was played out, and the democracies' half-hearted attempts to devise a new containment policy proved powerless to prevent the rush toward war.

How did the victorious powers of 1919 allow themselves to be reduced to the abject position that they occupied in September 1938? This is the question that engages Telford Taylor in his new book on Munich, surely the longest book on its subject (more than 1000 large pages) and possibly the best—certainly more comprehensive than Sir John Wheeler-Bennett's early assessment in *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (1948) and sounder in judgment than A. J. P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War* (1962). And the answer that emerges from his account—"the lesson of Munich," as he calls it on his last page—is that they were the victims of a persistent unwillingness to face up to unpleasant realities and to make the hard decisions these called for.

This was a malady that affected all sections of politically conscious society in Britain and France—the government parties and the opposition, the civil service and the military establishment, the press and the universities, and the electorate—and it first assumed its malignant forms in the early 1930s, when the world depression shook the confidence of the democracies and began to erode the foundations of the international system. The first aggressive moves of the dictators—Hitler's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October 1933, his repudiation of the arms clauses of the Versailles Treaty in March 1935, Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia later in that year, and the German reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936—came when the British and French peoples were distracted by domestic problems and disinclined to divert their attention or their resources to foreign ones. In each case, their governments took refuge in sonorous declarations of principle which, with a feckless disregard for consequences, they refused

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to back with action. The dictators got what they wanted by default and learned the valuable lesson that the democracies were so unwilling to make sacrifices that they could be fobbed off with any plausible promise of future good conduct.

There can be little doubt that the Western powers were overwhelmed by the vigor and the unconditionality of the dictators and that they slipped, quickly and unnecessarily, into a conviction of their own physical inferiority. This was particularly true of the leaders of their armed services. General Taylor, who is always at his best when analyzing military questions, points out that there was initially some excuse for cautious thinking on the part of the British military, which had been bound throughout the 1920s by the Ten Year Rule, which based planning on the assumption that no war was to be expected during the next 10 years, and which, even after the rule was lifted in 1932, was at the mercy of budget-cutters for the next seven years.

But granted that their rations were shorter than they thought safe, this hardly condones the service chiefs' persistent habit of exaggerating enemy strength and capabilities in time of crisis and crying doom, as they did in 1935 and 1936 and particularly in 1938, when the Air Ministry allowed German propaganda and alarmist and ill-informed speeches by Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh to persuade them that the Luftwaffe had a long-range bombing capacity that it did not, in fact, possess.

The French army was even worse, and General Gamelin's fantastically inflated estimates of German military strength at the time of the Rhineland reoccupation engendered a defeatism that wholly incapacitated the French government and had deplorable effects in the subsequent period. General Taylor quotes Charles De Gaulle's disgusted answer to Léon Blum's question in 1936 about the French attitude if Hitler should march on Vienna, Prague or Warsaw. "According to the circumstances," De Gaulle replied, "we shall have a limited call-up or a full mobilization. Then, peering through the battlements of our fortifications, we shall watch the enslavement of Europe."

That this prophecy proved to be accurate was, of course, due less to the advice of soldiers than to the decisions of governments or, more precisely, to the decision of the British government, since, as General Taylor points out, the French increasingly took their lead from London after the Rhineland debacle. In effect, this meant that after the beginning of 1937 the course of Western policy was being set by that most myopic of leaders, Neville Chamberlain. A man of arrogant demeanor and wounding temperament, whose lack of knowledge of foreign affairs was equaled only by his total self-assurance, Chamberlain convinced himself that peace could be assured by finding out what the dictators really wanted and seeing that they got it. It never seems to have occurred to him that he might be dealing with people whose voracity had no limits. Colleagues who hinted that this might be true or who had other doubts about his policy, he got rid of, as he did with Sir Robert Vansittart and Anthony Eden; facts that seemed to cast doubt on his chances of success, he ignored. Since he preached what most people wanted to hear, he never wanted for parliamentary majorities, and throughout 1938 his control over the country was hardly less complete than that of Hitler over Germany.

To appease Mussolini, and to prevent him from committing himself completely to Hitler, Chamberlain abandoned the principles that had guided Eden's Spanish policy, bullied the French into giving up the idea of launching a new program of aid for the republican government, recognized Mussolini's African conquests, and concluded a Mediterranean agreement with him—none of which dissuaded the Duce from continuing to bomb British ships in Spanish waters or from strengthening the Axis with Berlin. To appease Hitler, the prime minister showed sympathy for the German minority in Czechoslovakia from the beginning of the Sudeten controversy and projected his country into the dispute as a mediator despite the fact that the Czech government was allied with his associate France. Neither in Spain nor in Czechoslovakia did he show any sense of the strategic implications of his policy; and, in the latter case, when Hitler's position hardened, he proved ready to go to the utmost limit—and to make the French do the same—to gratify the Führer's desires. When Hitler betrayed at Godesberg the promises that he had made at Berchtesgaden and showed that he was



Chamberlain, Hitler and Schmidt in 1938 before signature of the Anglo-German declaration. Photo: Bundesarchiv.

Adolf Hitler made the Munich crisis, and Neville Chamberlain resolved it by the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia. But in so doing, he acted for the men and women of Britain as he divined their wishes, and at the time he read them aright. They wanted 'their normal lives' to 'last a little bit longer.'

It is not for us to criticize them; so do most of us today, despite looming perils such as poverty, pollution, resource depletion, terrorism, and nuclear warheads. Munich does not tell us how to overcome these hazards, but it is a potent and historically valid symbol of the dangers of not facing up to unpleasant realities. That is not a new lesson, but it is a great one, and it is the lesson of Munich.

Telford Taylor
from *Munich: The Price of Peace*

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intent on destroying Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain did not acknowledge the certain consequences of this for the West and resolve to resist; he merely mobilized opinion to prove that resistance would be catastrophic.

General Taylor's book is, of course, concerned as much with Hitler as with Chamberlain, and some of his best chapters deal with Hitler's mobilization of the resources of his country, his difficulties in allaying the doubts and anxieties of his senior army commanders (who were by no means as assured of their superiority as their Western counterparts seemed to be), the evolution of his association with the Italian dictator, his manipulation of the Spanish war as a means of increasing the Duce's dependence upon him and of distracting the West, and his skillful playing upon the fears and illusions of the Western leaders. (It is disconcerting to note how Chamberlain, who first thought Hitler "the commonest little dog he had ever seen," clung pathetically to the belief that the Führer respected and even liked him—which was the reverse of the truth.)

Nor does the author focus his attention exclusively upon his main actors. The story of the greedy illusionism of Polish policy is to be found here, and that of the crumbling of the Little Entente, and the grim account of the great purges in Russia, for, as General Taylor points out, what happened in Eastern Europe influenced both German and Western calculations; whether and how the Soviet Union would aid Czechoslovakia was the most baffling of riddles in the summer of 1938. Statesmen like Stoyadinovitch of Yugoslavia and Kanya of Hungary have long been forgotten by all but the specialists, but they were people of some consequence in 1938 and often in the headlines, and they live once more in General Taylor's pages and seem, on balance, to be no more improbable than Ambassador William C. Bullitt of the United States with his violent anti-Czech prejudices and his feeling that the United States should help the French get out of their moral commitment to Hitler's victim—or, for that matter, than the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, who told a German visitor in July 1938 that he had "only one goal, which was that one day the Führer, as guest of the King at Buckingham Palace, would be greeted by the cheerio of the English masses."

Many of those who defended Chamberlain's policy in September 1938, particularly the service chiefs, and most of those who have written about his prime ministership since, have argued that, by going to Munich, he gave Britain an extra year in which to strengthen her defenses for the great trial of arms. General Taylor refutes this by means of a devastating review of Chamberlain's role in armament, both as chancellor of the exchequer and as prime minister. Despite attempts by Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and Winston Churchill to blame Britain's arms deficiencies upon Stanley Baldwin rather than upon his successor, General Taylor demonstrates that Britain's first real rearmament program in the interwar period was planned under Baldwin, that much of the weaponry of World War II—including the Hurricanes and Spitfires, the four-engine bombers and the radar defenses—were designed and put into production in the Baldwin era, and that Baldwin brought men of energy and ideas like Swinton, Inskip and Duff-Cooper into the service departments.

The lag came later, when Chamberlain was prime minister, when the services were put on a rationing plan that delayed fleet expansion, curtailed aircraft production, and stopped all progress toward an army capable of warfare in Europe. Nor should it be forgotten that the prime minister was so sure that the Munich agreement heralded an era of peace that he could not be persuaded to accelerate arms production until April 1939, after the fall of Prague. Britain did, of course, make some gains in the year between Munich and the invasion of Poland, but nothing in comparison with the progress of the German Wehrmacht, which doubled its armored strength, brought its army up to a unit strength equal to that of France, and greatly improved the quality and performance of the Luftwaffe.

This raises the broader question of whether Britain and France would not have been in a better position to win a war against Germany in 1938 than they were a year later. Admitting the imponderabilia involved, General Taylor is inclined to believe that this is true. It is unlikely that Germany would have been supported in 1938 by Italy, which

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remained neutral in 1939, or by Japan, and Franco had no reason or capacity to intervene. On the Western side, Britain and France could count on Czech support, and—despite the Chamberlain government's persistent denigration, on small evidence, of Czech fighting qualities—the Czech army was better armed and their fortifications stronger than was true in the case of Poland in 1939. Depending upon the intensity of their own efforts, they could probably also have counted upon some Soviet assistance, for the Soviets, who had a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia, could hardly have afforded to stand idly by if the French came in. The Poles, out of political calculation, might very well have swung into line too and, if they did not, would certainly not have aided Germany against the democracies, a course that Colonel Beck once described as an impossibility. All in all, the Eastern front in 1938 would have been stronger than it was a year later.

At the same time, the Western front would for the Germans have been much weaker as long as they were attacking the Czechs. The Todt Organization had been making frantic efforts to build a defensive line along the western borders of the Reich, but the West Wall, as General Adam, the commander in the West, complained, had no real existence, and the forces assigned to protect it were a mere screen, insufficient to resist a determined French thrust. If to all this is added the fact that British offensive air strength was as strong in 1938 as it was in 1939, that the Germans had no capability to bomb Britain, and that Britain possessed decisive naval superiority, the conclusion, in General Taylor's words, is inevitable that the West "would have been better off had they fought in support of Czechoslovakia in 1938 instead of throwing her to the wolves." If they had been determined to do so, and had made this manifest, they might indeed have been assisted by an anti-Hitler *Putsch* led by senior German generals, for people like Adam and Halder and Beck had no faith in a successful war and wanted to prevent it. General Taylor is inclined to doubt whether the planning for such a revolt was circumstantial enough to promise success; but that there were rudiments of a generals' plot in 1938, in contrast to 1939, is clear and, successful or not, its potential for disruption was undeniable.

But none of this counted in September 1938. The real tragedy was that Chamberlain's determination to have peace defeated any perception of the actual balance of forces. In both the British and French governments, there were people who wanted to stand up to Hitler and who realized that failure to do so now would mean having to fight on weaker ground later. But this unpleasant reality was obscured by the meretricious argument that an attempt to fight for the Czechs would mean the destruction of London and Paris by aerial bombardment, whereas abandoning them would mean lasting peace. In Winston Churchill's formulation, the West was given the choice between war and dishonor. They chose the latter and got war too, and in a more fearful form.

Gordon A. Craig

Gordon A. Craig is the J. Wallace Sterling Professor of Humanities and chairman of the history department at Stanford University. His most recent book is the volume *Germany, 1866-1945* in the Oxford History of Modern Europe.

The Sui Dynasty: The Unification of China, A.D. 581-617 by Arthur F. Wright

(Knopf; $15)

For more than 20 years Arthur Wright was fascinated by the brief Sui Dynasty, whose two emperors ruled China between 581 and 617 AD. He was fascinated particularly by the fact that in this brief compass the dynasty presented a microcosm of the dynastic cycle, from reunification after disorder, through grandeur and apparent stability, and down to ruinous foreign adventure and internal maladministration. The two emperors, Sui Wen-ti and Sui Yang-ti, endowed by later Confucian historians with traits that spanned a complex range of "good" and "bad" stereotypes, presented Wright as historiographer with an absorbing array of interpretative problems. It is a cause for real sorrow that Arthur Wright died before he could quite complete this manuscript, in which so much learning and subtlety is condensed; yet there is solace in the fact that this book—thanks to patient work by his former student Robert Somers and a beautiful production job by Knopf editors and staff—will live on as a major contribution to our understanding of China's past.

The story of the Sui is violent and tense, unfolding over a giant panorama from Vietnam in the far south to Manchuria in the north, and to the western reaches of what is now Kansu province. It involves the seizure of power by a trusted minister of the Northern Chou dynasty in 581 AD and his self-transformation into the new Sui emperor Wen-ti; his breaking of the power of the Southern Chinese dynasty of Ch'en in 589; the complex power struggles between Wen-ti's sons that finally led to the accession of Yang-ti in 604; and Yang-ti's increasing obsession after 609 with the costly and dangerous campaigns against the intransigent state of Koguryō (incorporating what is now East Manchuria and North Korea), which helped bring the emperor to his doom in 618. Arthur Wright's ability to combine the vast sweep of story with an intense concision of style is nowhere shown better than in his (apparently laconic) description of this emperor's death: "In 618, he was murdered in his bathhouse by Yu-wen Hua-chi, descendant of the house his father had so ruthlessly displaced and the son of his most trusted general, Yu-wen Shu."

The Sui Dynasty is a book of astonishing richness, for despite the short time span covered we are treated here to case studies of a score or more areas of historical importance, each of which demands different treatments and the marshalling of different angles of focus. Pacing the book with the control of a master-historian, Wright mingles vignettes with passages that define the nature and content of Confucianism, the depth of faith and the economic structures of 6th-century Buddhism, the awesome logistical and architectural details of the building of the new Sui capital city, the intense preparation of

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IN BELMERTON

Maybe in one of these bleached and tilting houses,
Though they all look silent, some good talk has begun.
Down they come, each tenant from his own room
To share his meditations in the kitchen,
Repeating unawares words spoken thirty years ago
In this same declining neighborhood, sweet local phrases
Now gone over across the road to sink quietly down
In the cloverfield, humming to the end their faint song.

This peeling paint on the porches doesn't have to mean
That all the homeowners feel powerless, caught with no plans
To stop or slow their downfall. And even if it does
A few may want to gather in the evening by the stove
And review the situation, and find a name for what's happening,
So that later, when the worst comes, lumbering down the road,
They won't be surprised, but will go on with their meal.

And whatever they read, whatever deeds their neighbors
Consider remarkable, they'll judge among themselves,
Toasting at the table all that deserves praise,
And all that doesn't shouting down. The world has chosen wrong
Because it's frantic, starved for good news; but they keep calm.

Do you ask more from your city than more houses like this,
With the light on other porches meaning what it means here
Among this vanguard, where each climbs back to his own room
Less troubled that his talents go unrecognized,
Unremembered by strangers in their cars, stopped for the train,
Their minds for a moment gone wandering?

If you find this house by evening and ring the bell,
The tenants who open the door, food on their fingers,
Hope that you're hungry but not lost,
Or if lost, that you've guessed where you went wrong,
And will let them in on the whole story
And the usable truth it signifies.

Carl Dennis

the great land and amphibious assault armies (half a million strong in total) that brought down the Ch'en dynasty, and the agonizing mistakes of the fatal Koguryō campaigns. Haunting too, at this present time, is Wright's description of the Sui's unsuccessful campaigns into the Chiao-chou area of Champa, in what is now the stretch of territory between Hanoi and Haiphong: drawn by greed, a Chinese army managed to sack the capital, but they were struck by epidemics and retreated, harassed by the enemy, in failure and confusion. "The whole effort," says Wright, "was a costly failure, and all the Chinese had to show for it was the stolen ancestral tablets, some cases of Buddhist scriptures, and a troupe of captured musicians."

But the swifty etched portraits of the leading actors in the drama are equally memorable: both the emperors, of course, whom Wright had studied so long and carefully, with their religious devotion, their administrative skills, their sudden murderous rages and their spells of remorse; but also the women in the story, whether Wen-ti's deeply loved wife, who acted as his shrewd adviser and counselor on his climb to power, but later fell into bitterness and neurosis, or that formidable power-broker of Southern China, the Lady Ch'iao-kuo, who managed to consolidate her own power base even as she let the Sui develop theirs; and finally the many advisers around the throne, such as Kao Chiung and Yang Su, Su Wei and Niu Hung in the first reign, or the sycophants and bullies of the second reign who contributed so much to the dynasty's collapse.

If one has a quibble about this book it is that at times the stereotyping of the sources may, despite Wright's wary eye, enter his own narrative and make us briefly suspend belief. Was the defeated Ch'en emperor, for example, really pulled out of a well with "a dripping concubine hanging to him on each side," delightful though the image is? Did Yu-wen Pin, the last adult ruler of the northern Chou, truly "commit the ultimate impropriety" by feasting and drinking from the ritual vessels lodged in the imperial ancestral halls? As Wright himself says, in a passage near the end of his book, which surely constitutes one of the most brief yet astute passages on traditional Chinese historiography yet written:

How shall we explain the discrepancy between the almost legendary evil depicted in such passages as these and the solid advantages of a canal network seen by some contemporaries

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and by modern historians? Confucian officials who kept the records and wrote the histories in general did not favor great increases in central power and frowned on its flamboyant use by a reigning monarch; their physiocratic economic view saw no advantage in economic growth; their counsels as statesmen and their records as historians emphasized the high cost and the disadvantages of foreign military adventures. All emperors were, however covertly, the natural opponents as well as the necessary allies of all officials.

Some of these questions of characterization and motive will never be solved, and all one can say is that Wright is usually deft in making us aware of the type of source he is using, and of when we should suspect or trust them. And he is, to me, totally convincing in his belief that the events he describes are of the greatest importance to later Chinese history (a point well re-emphasized by Robert Somers in his afterword chapter on the great T'ang dynasty [617-908] that followed the Sui).

Here is one of Wright's grandest paragraphs, in which he summarizes the reading of a scholarly lifetime with an absolute economy:

The Chinese had long called this entire area with its diverse climates, peoples, and cultures T'ien-hsia, "all under Heaven." It is scarcely surprising that they regarded it as the vast stage on which the whole human drama was enacted. Nor is it surprising that they regarded the struggles for control of all or part of it as the decisive events in the history of civilization—events that at once measured the stature of those who succeeded or failed in the great enterprise and determined the future of all civilized men for decades or centuries to come. This then, in rough terms, is the scale, geographic and cultural, of the Sui undertaking. This is the scale which we must keep in mind in assessing the degree of their success.

And this too is the scale we may invoke when acknowledging the degree of Arthur Wright's success in this beautiful and absorbing book.

Jonathan Spence

Jonathan Spence is the author of *The Death of Woman Wang* (Viking).

Innocents of the West by Joan Colebrook

(Basic Books; $15)

That the Soviet Union seeks to influence public opinion in the United States is a contention few people would care to challenge, but just how it sets about doing this, and how successful its efforts have been, are matters which have rarely been discussed. Although Moscow's interpretation of Marxist doctrine has always been notoriously flexible, it seems a bit far-fetched that it would hire Madison Avenue-type public relations agencies to spread its message. Nor is it more credible to suppose that the Soviet Union would confine its blandishments to the limited circle of insomniacs who tune in to the nightly broadcasts from Radio Moscow, or to the glossy but insipid pages of *Soviet Life*. How, then, is the Soviet propaganda offensive actually waged?

It was in order to answer this question—for herself as much as for anyone else—that in 1964 Joan Colebrook, the peripatetic, Australian-born novelist and journalist, began a diary in which she recorded her observations of, and on, the political culture in the United States, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Completed in 1969, and published a decade later, her journal is both a vivid, splendidly-written evocation of the 1960s, and, much more importantly, a revealing description of the channels of influence by means of which the Soviet Union manipulated American public opinion.

The 1960s, Miss Colebrook reminds us, were years during which students, not only in America but around the world, were "engulfed by . . . a wave of ideology, much of it neo-Marxist in nature." This neo-Marxian revival was compounded of various elements: an exaltation of the revolutionary vocation, as embodied in the life and death of Che Guevara; a belief in the efficacy of violence, or "People's War," which drew its inspiration from Mao's writings; an appreciation of the crucial role of organization, which harked back to Lenin; and a ready-made "class-analysis" of the evils of "capitalism" and "imperialism," which parroted a vulgarized Marxism. Unlike their predecessors of the 1930s, for whom ideological exactitude was the very stuff of politics, radicals of the 1960s would call themselves Maoists or Guevaristas with equal ease. All that really mattered to them was to "make" the revolution.

To the Soviet officials charged with the conduct of anti-American propaganda, argues Colebrook, the *soi-disant* revolutionaries of the New Left were a useful wedge for undermining American society from "inside." That some New Leftists designated themselves Maoists, or even Trotskyites, was of little consequence. As Boris Stefanov, Comintern delegate to Spain during the Civil War, remarked to one of his comrades, "For us, as you well know, there are neither friends nor enemies; there are persons who serve and persons who do not." That the American radicals might render more effective service, however, it was necessary to coordinate their efforts, to provide them with training in the conspiratorial and terrorist arts, and to bring them into contact with anti-American forces throughout the world. It was here that the Cubans played a "key role."

According to Colebrook, long before Cuba had become Moscow's military proxy, it was already serving as its ideological proxy. Unlike the Soviet Union, Cuba in the 1960s was still politically sexy. It was from Cuba, as Norman Mailer said, that the New Left derived its political aesthetic, and it was to Cuba that Americans flocked to hear the Word, harvest the sugar cane, and avail themselves of Cuban training and advice. These Americans, who would surely have hesitated long and hard before associating themselves with a Moscow-based propaganda offensive, eagerly attached themselves to Havana's campaign. That the latter was controlled by the former was something they seemed not to realize. Thus, Soviet propaganda permeated the United States via a series of transmission belts: Moscow to Havana, Havana to the New Left, the New Left to the American campus, and the campus to society at large.

The tragedy of the 1960s, however, was that there were "innocents" on both sides of the barricades: among the

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power-hungry "revolutionaries," who failed to understand that they themselves were being used in a cynical power-play, but also among representatives of the American establishment, who appeared incapable of recognizing that the United States was under concerted attack around the world, and who, in the face of charges of universal American malevolence, seemed unable, or unwilling, to respond. Colebrook writes:

Americans not understanding how important they are, how much their drama has meant to the world at large, can think of nothing to do but apologize. . . . And now that the United States has been declared the enemy, not only by 'outside' groups, or by those 'inside' groups ideologically opposed to her; but as well by some of her establishment and many of her intellectuals and professionals—a sense of guilt is defacing truth.

In the stormy area of race relations, Colebrook contends that this sense of guilt—certainly not gratuitous—blinded American leaders to the fact that the riots that erupted in urban black ghettos during the latter half of the 1960s were not simply necessary gestures of rebellion brought on by social deprivation, but were often deliberately incited by black militants "firmly locked into the Havana-based guerrilla machine." Especially in affluent circles ("where everyone seems to have pure, guileless, 'liberal' thoughts"), it was believed that these militants could be won over by demonstrations of good will, as well as by more tangible concessions made largely at the expense of the despised lower middle class; the possibility that Black Power advocates would settle for nothing less than the destruction of America was not considered.

The anti- (Vietnam) war movement is also cited by Colebrook, correctly, as an instance of how American feelings of guilt—again, not unwarranted—distorted the truth. For the truth was that Ho Chi Minh was not simply a Vietnamese nationalist (*their* Lincoln), but an experienced and gifted Stalinist agent, and that he and his successors sought not only to unify Vietnam, but to communize it as well. It is also true—if we are to believe the Vietnamese refugees, some of whom had previously collaborated with the NLF—that the system that Saigon's "liberators" have imposed on the South is far worse than that which preceded it.

But for those American activists, and they were not a few, who made the pilgrimage to Hanoi or who identified themselves, openly or covertly, with the cause of third world "anti-imperialism," any criticism of Hanoi's conduct was automatically suspect. Unfortunately, given the reluctance of more moderate critics of the war to engage their radical colleagues in serious debate, these activists set the moral tone of the anti-war movement as a whole.

Although the United States was the principal target of radical activists everywhere, Colebrook notes that by 1966 Israel had already become the "intermediate" target of the "New Left/Arab/black coalition":

The white Israelis and 'white Colonial oppressors' are lumped together and opposed to the third-world anti-colonial, anti-capitalist dark-skinned peoples in that kind of bitter polarization which marks an ominous step forward in negative political campaigns. Every speech, every article, and the whole vocabulary in use are impregnated with visceral references to Israelis who are planning genocide; pro-Israeli imperialists who are using napalm; whites who are pro-apartheid and exploiting blacks in South Africa; and black victims of white Zionist Jewish landlords here in U.S. cities. There are even references to gas ovens with the old victims (the Jews) mysteriously turned into operators.

In the case of Israel, however, these efforts to mold the climate of American public opinion met with serious opposition. Jews and non-Jews alike, who were willing to give Castro the benefit of every doubt, who were prepared to concede that Mao was the savior of the Chinese and that American blacks were the victims of systematic genocide, balked when they were called upon to endorse Israel's destruction. (Colebrook tells the story of a Jewish friend of hers who, when told of Mao's advice to *Al Fatah*'s Ahmed Shukairy—"If you Arabs are 40 million and the Jews are only 2 million . . . what are you waiting for?"—replied in a shocked voice, "Surely this is a misquotation!") The ideologues of the New Left succeeded in imposing their viewpoint on other matters only because hardly anyone cared to answer them back. When, on Israel, people finally *did* answer back, their seemingly irresistible offensive was checked. No wonder Moscow is so bitterly critical of American "Zionists"!

In the 1970s, the New Left ran out of steam. The end of the war in Vietnam, the dawning realization that Castro's Cuba is not the mythical kingdom of the revolution, and the horrors that ensued upon the American withdrawal from Indochina, have persuaded students in the United States to go back to their books. No longer, then, do they "conjure up for themselves a make-believe world of 'action' so as to divert themselves from their dream-smooth academic existences"; Cuban sugar cane is harvested by others now. Perhaps this is why Soviet propagandists have modified their approach. Instead of relying mainly on ideological techniques of persuasion, they now promote what turn-of-the-century anarchists called "propaganda of the deed," i.e., terrorism. One thing, at any rate, is clear: although the cold war has been officially declared over, the Soviet Union's war of aggression against the West continues unabated. Joan Colebrook has written an invaluable account of how that war was waged—and, in part, won—during the terrible 1960s. It deserves a wide audience.

Joseph Shattan

Joseph Shattan is a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford.

Brief Review

A Streak of Luck
by Robert Conot

(Seaview Books; $15.95)

When he heard an acquaintance refer to his "Godlike genius," Thomas Alva Edison (1847-1931) responded characteristically. "Godlike nothing!" he snorted. "Sticking to it is the genius." Robert Conot has managed to penetrate the myth of the solitary genius to show us the man and the methods behind the landmark inventions—including the mimeograph, the phonograph, the incandescent light and the alkaline storage battery—that laid the groundwork for modern life.

As lab assistant Francis Jehl said, "Edison is in reality a collective noun and means the work of many men." In fact, Edison was the catalyst of a team of inventors. He devised a grand scheme for each new invention; Charles Batchelor, his partner and co-inventor,

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transformed the abstract idea into a practical drawing; and John Kreusi, his principal machinist, constructed a workable model. Men put in months or even years of painstaking trial-and-error work on each new invention, urged on by Edison's confidence and unfailing optimism.

By concentrating on the tensions and breakthroughs at the laboratory, Conot has produced a fast-paced biography. This focus is justifiable, since Edison centered his life around his work, and lived more at the lab than at home. During one particularly intense stretch of work, his wife Mina followed him with a blanket and pillow and covered him up when—as was his habit—he fell asleep on a lab table or in a small closet.

Always practical, Edison invented in order to make money. Mercifully, Conot skims lightly over patent disputes, manufacturing rights, stock ownership, and the juggling and fumbling of the world of high finance. Edison's business sense lagged far behind his inventive intuition. Having developed some of the basic concepts for the radio, Edison gave up the idea as impractical. Even years later, when radio became popular, Edison insisted there was no money to be made in the field. "It will die out in time so far as music is concerned," he predicted.

L.D.

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Washington Diarist

Resentment

Resentment, we learn from Nietzsche, fuels the world. It also motivates journalists. What's offended more than a few of them these days—including two recent diarists in *TNR*—is the refusal of the Senate to limit its members to $8625 of outside earned income. There is still a ceiling of $25,000 a year on honoraria for speeches (but no limit on what they can make now from brain surgery). Corruptibility begins, apparently, someplace short of 10 grand. I don't see why senators should have to observe any limit at all. But zeal for other folks' abstinence is a specialty of press types. (Of senators, too, it must be pointed out in fairness, since Congress hypocritically maintains a flat ban on outside earned income for high-level presidential appointees.) It was harsh truth-teller Pat Moynihan who pointed out that $66,000 is not exactly a princely sum if you have a large family, must maintain two homes, and were accustomed to higher income before being elected to public office. The restrictive rules do not extend to unearned income, which means that the rich are entitled to both their wealth and their biases. Already politics in general, and the Senate in particular, have become playgrounds for the rich, who no longer have polo to play in the fall. What's likely to happen is that accomplished individuals who've made it into the upper middle class, but who are by no means wealthy, will shy away from elective office. Drying up the talent pool for Congress is not something we can afford. I wonder why the egalitarian zeal of my better-paid employees does not extend to their wage negotiations with the *TNR* exchequer.

Another traditional focus for resentment by the zealots of reform has been the ease and regularity with which people take the public-to-private-sector employment shuttle, often dealing with identical matters in both jobs. A lawyer would join a regulatory agency and then work for a corporation being regulated. The "revolving door," it was called. "Sweetheart arrangements" is how campaigner Jimmy Carter characterized this movement, another reflection of his exquisite sensitivity to the ethics in government issue. Congress passed and the president approved legislation limiting this mobility. The rules take effect July 1. Unless the rules are significantly modified, the weeks leading up to that date will see an exodus of talent from government as high US officials take action to protect their futures. What's wrong with most of these restrictions is the assumption that the significant corruptions of our society derive from concrete conflict-of-interest situations, which they don't. These limits also impose intolerable burdens on middle-class professionals. The high-minded rules were first drafted in the White House by an already wealthy heir to a still wealthier fortune, who doesn't seem to understand the anxiety of public servants whose only tangible assets are their abilities. That's all they have in office, and all they'll have when they're out. When I was a graduate student some years ago, a fellow student, who had negligently allowed the deadline for scholarship applications to pass, asked his faculty adviser what he should do. "I am afraid you'll have to dip into capital," counseled the learned professor. He was the last of a particularly obtuse type. Reformers, inside and outside the press, often capable of empathy for the poor, can muster none for achieving members of the middle class.

A traditional ombudsman is someone hired by the government to protect citizens from the government's own injustices and caprice. In keeping with the press's fashionable sense of its own importance these days, several newspapers have hired ombudspersons to protect their readers in a similar manner. Anent the ongoing saga of the *Washington Post*'s shabby report (February 7) alleging systematic Israeli torture of Arab prisoners, we now have a report by the ombudsman of the *Boston Globe*, Charles L. Whipple. The *Globe* played follow the leader to the *Post* on the torture allegations. The truth is out seven weeks late (buried alas in the back pages): not only was the story "confusing and misleading," and "more sensational than was warranted," and "not as free from defects as it . . . should have been," all of which Charles Seib, the *Post*'s ombudsman, admitted earlier. The story also left out, Whipple asserts, other facts materially affecting the plausibility of the charges against Israel. The *Post* should have reported, among other significant omissions, that "convicted terrorists are ineligible for US visas . . . that such Arabs have an obvious self-interest in claiming torture, either to obtain a visa, or try to prevent reprisal from the PLO, or both." Despite Seib's criticism of the initial *Post* coverage, that paper ran a later article (March 4) trying to bolster its accusations against Israel by suggesting that Israel was making it difficult for the International Committee of the Red Cross to evaluate such charges. The *Globe* had again played follow the leader. When will it learn not to follow the *Post*? Whipple found that "the few facts in this story were flimsy." Red Cross personnel had denied that they were facts in the first place. The torture story came up at a meeting between a Ford Foundation panel on the press and *Post* executives. The consensus there too: shoddy. Those fascinated by this story but lacking access to an ombudsman can find an exhaustive critique of the *Post* story in the February 24 *TNR*.

Robespierre promised a "republic of virtue." Khomeini has given us a "Government of God." The Kurds don't agree; nor do the Turkomans and Baluchis. Their abstention from last week's referendum in Iran on the question of an Islamic republic (the only proffered option being a return to the shah) is buried in the 98 percent approval tally which just about any tyrant can muster. Apparently these and other minorities didn't much matter either to the Western commentators who reported the ayatollah ascendancy as reflecting the people's will. Which people? That's always the rub. The election in Iran seems to me to be at least as illegitimate as the vote planned in Rhodesia, where great procedural displays will also precede a foregone conclusion. But there aren't many establishment voices tut-tutting about the preposterous referendum just carried out by the revolutionary Khomitehs in their own behalf. Some say there is no alternative to the living theater of terror when a dictator falls. The case of India after Mrs. Ghandi suggests this isn't even always true. But even if it often is, what I don't understand is why some so-called progressives try to make a virtue out of what could be called at best, and stretching it at that, a desperate inevitability. Two weeks running now the *Nation* has published editorials in praise of the new regime. What that regime has going for it among some on the left is solely its hostility to the US. I'm sure that this posture doesn't console the regime's victims. But it does provide the regime an unsavory international solidarity. The fall of the Pahlavi monarchy, the *Nation* editorializes, "has at last freed the people to dream—and freed them from the past as well." It's a strange judgment on theological obscurantism and the omnipresent political police.

M.P.

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

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